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Abstract
To analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation, we embed
multitasking and screening within a Hotelling framework. Competition for talent leads to an
escalation of performance pay, shifting e¤ort away from long-term investments, risk management
and cooperation. E¢ ciency losses can exceed those from a single principal, who dulls incentives
to extract rents. As competition intensies, monopsonistic underincentivization of low-skill agents
rst decreases, then gives way to growing overincentivization of high-skill ones. Aggregate welfare is
thus hill-shaped, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps can help restore balance
in incentives, but may generate other distortions.
Keywords: incentives, performance pay, bonuses, executive compensation, inequality, multitask,
contracts, screening, adverse selection, moral hazard, work ethic, Hotelling, competition.
JEL Classication: D31, D82, D86, J31, J33, L13, M12
The dangers of the new pay structures were clear, but senior executives believed
they were powerless to change it. Former Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill told the Com-
mission, I think if you look at the results of what happened on Wall Street, it became,
Well, this ones doing it, so how can I not do it, if I dont do it, then the people are going
to leave my place and go someplace else.Managing risk became less of an important
function in a broad base of companies, I would guess.
(Final Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p. 63-64)
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a literal explosion of pay, both in levels and in di¤erentials, at the top
echelons of many occupations. Large bonuses and salaries are needed, it is typically said, to retain
talentand top performersin nance, corporations, medicine, academia, as well as to incentivize
them to perform to the best of their high abilities. Paradoxically, this trend has been accompanied
by mounting revelations of poor actual performance, severe moral hazard and even outright fraud
in those same sectors. Oftentimes these behaviors impose negative spillovers on the rest of society
(e.g., bank bailouts), but even when not, the rms involved themselves ultimately su¤er: large
trading losses, declines in stock value, loss of reputation and consumer goodwill, regulatory nes
and legal liabilities, or even bankruptcy.
This paper proposes a resolution of the puzzle, by showing how competition for the most
productive workers can interact with the incentive structure inside rms to undermine work ethics
the extent to which agents do the right thingbeyond what their material self-interest commands.
More generally, the underlying idea is that highly competitive labor markets make it di¢ cult for
employers to strike the proper balance between the benets and costs of high-powered incentives.
The result is a bonus culture that takes over the workplace, generating distorted decisions and
signicant e¢ ciency losses, particularly in the long run. To make this point we develop a model that
combines multitasking, screening and imperfect competition, making a methodological contribution
in the process.
Inside each rm, agents perform both a task that is easily measured (sales, output, trading
prots, billable medical procedures) and one that is not and therefore involves an element of public-
goods provision (intangible investments a¤ecting long-run value, nancial or legal risk-taking, co-
operation among individuals or divisions). Agents potentially di¤er in their productivity for the
rewardable task and in their intrinsic willingness to provide the unrewarded one their work ethic.
When types are observable, the standard result applies: principals set relatively low-powered in-
centives that optimally balance workers e¤ort allocation; competition then only a¤ects the size
of xed compensation. Things change fundamentally when skill levels are unobservable, leading
rms to o¤er contracts designed to screen di¤erent types of workers. A single principal (monop-
sonist, collusive industry) sets the power of incentives even lower than the social optimum, so as
to extract rents from the more productive agents. Labor-market competition, however, introduces
a new role for performance pay: because it is di¤erentially attractive to more productive workers,
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it also serves as a device which rms use to attract or retain these types. Focusing rst on the
limiting case of perfect competition, we show that the degree of incentivization is always above the
social optimum, and identify a simple condition under which the resulting distortion exceeds that
occurring under monopsony. Competitive bidding for talent is thus destructive of work ethics, and
ultimately welfare-reducing. Skill-biased technical change (which raises rmsreturns to screening)
aggravates these distortions further and disproportionately widens pay inequality.
We then develop a Hotelling-like variant of competitive screening to analyze the equilibrium
contracts under arbitrary degrees of imperfect competition. In the standard Hotelling model, the
transport-cost or taste parameter simultaneously a¤ects competition within the market and the
attractiveness of the outside option. To isolate the pure e¤ect of competitiveness, we introduce an
intuitive but novel modelling device that disentangles cross-brand from cross-market substitution
opportunities. This full-spectrumHotelling model provides a simple, one-parameter family of
rivalry contexts ranging from perfect competition to complete monopoly. Embedding the multitask
adverse-selection problem into this framework, we show that as mobility costs (or horizontal di¤er-
entiation) decline, the monopsonistic underincentivization of low-skill agents gradually decreases,
then at some point gives way to a growing overincentivization of high-skill ones. Aggregate welfare
is thus hill-shaped with respect to competition, while comprehensive measures of inequality (gaps
in utility or total earnings) tend to rise monotonically.
When agents can acquire skills, the distribution of types becomes endogenous. Greater compe-
tition spurs human-capital investments by protecting them from the hold-up problem, but simul-
taneously reduces the positive externalities they have on rmsprots, which vanish in the limit.
The result that an intermediate level of competition is optimal is therefore robust to this ex-ante
perspective. Turning to policy implications, we show that a cap on bonuses can restore balance
in agentsincentives, and even re-establish the rst best, as long as it does not induce employers
to switch to some alternative currencyto screen employees. When it does, the displacement of
screening to a less e¢ cient dimension can make regulation of either bonuses or total compensation
welfare-reducing.
In our baseline model, one task is unobservable or noncontractible, and thus performed solely
out of intrinsic motivation. This (standard) specication of the multitask problem is convenient,
but inessential for the main results. We thus extend the analysis to the case where performance in
both tasks is measurable and hence rewarded, but noisy, which limits the power of incentives e.g.,
yearly bonuses and deferred compensationgiven to risk averse agents. This not only demonstrates
robustness (no reliance on intrinsic motivation) but also yields a new set of results that bring to
light how the distorted incentive structure under competition (or monopsony) and the resulting
misallocation of e¤ort are shaped by the measurement noise in each task, agents comparative
advantage across them, and risk aversion. The model also explains why rms make only limited
use of long-term incentives such as deferred compensation or clawbacks: each one would like to use
them more, but in equilibrium none can a¤ord to.
Finally, we contrast our main analysis of competition for talent with the polar case where agents
have the same productivity in the measurable task but di¤er in their ethical motivation for the
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unmeasurable one. In this case, competition is shown to be either benecial (reducing the overin-
centivization which a monopsonist uses to extract rent, but never causing underincentivization), or
neutral as occurs in a variant of the model where ethical motivation generates positive spillovers
inside the rm instead of private benets for the agent.
The paper relates to four broad theoretical literatures: adverse selection, multitasking, manager-
ial compensation, and intrinsic motivation. We defer this discussion to Section 8, where connections
and di¤erences will be clearer in light of the formal model. The rest of Section 1 discusses instead
the empirical evidence linking competition, performance pay, moral hazard and income inequality.
Section 2 presents the basic model, Section 3 compares the outcomes under monopsony and perfect
competition, and Section 4 analyses the full imperfectly competitive spectrum. Section 5 examines
the e¤ects of pay regulation. Section 6 allows both tasks to be observable, while Section 7 considers
heterogeneity in motivation rather than ability. Section 8 concludes. The main proofs are gathered
in Appendices A and B, more technical ones in online Appendices C and D.
1.1 Evidence
 Managerial compensation. While our paper is not specically about executive pay, this is an
important application of the model. The literature on managerial compensation is usually seen as
organized along two contrasting lines (see, e.g., Frydman and Jenter (2010) for a recent survey). On
one hand is the view that high executive rewards reect a high demand for rare skills (Rosen 1981)
and the e¢ cient workings of a competitive market allocating talent to where it is most productive,
for instance to manage larger rms (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Edmans et al. 2009). Rising pay at
the top is then simply the appropriate price response to market trends favoring the best workers:
skilled-biased technical change, improvements in monitoring, growth in the size of rms, entry or
decreases in mobility costs.
On the other side is the view that the level and structure of managerial compensation reect
signicant market failures. For instance, indolent or captured boards may grant top executives
pay packages far in excess of their marginal product (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001, Bebchuk
and Fried 2004, Piketty et al. 2014). Alternatively, managers are given incentive schemes that do
maximize prots but impose signicant negative externalities on the rest of society by inducing
excessive short-termism and risk-taking at the expense of consumers, depositors or taxpayers 
public bailouts and environmental cleanups, tax arbitrage, etc. (e.g., Bolton et al. 2006, Besley
and Ghatak 2011). In particular, private returns in the nance industry are often argued to exceed
social returns (Baumol 1990, Philippon and Reshef 2012).
Our paper takes on board the rst views premise that pay levels and di¤erentials largely reect
market returns to both talent and measured performance, magnied in recent decades by technical
change and increased mobility. At the same time, and closer in that to the second view, we show
that this very same escalation of performance-based pay can be the source of severe distortions and
long-run welfare losses in the sectors where it occurs even absent any externalities on the rest of
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society, and a fortiori in their presence.1
 Performance pay and competition for talent. Although bankersbonuses and CEO pay packages
attract the most attention, the parallel rise in incentive pay and earnings inequality is a much
broader, economy-wide phenomenon, as established by Lemieux et al. (2009). Between the late
1970s and the 1990s, the fraction of jobs paid based on performance rose from 38% to 45%, and for
salaried workers from 45% to 60%. Further compounding the direct impact on inequality is the fact
that the returns to skills, both observable (education, experience, job tenure) and unobservable,
are much higher in such jobs. This last nding also suggests that di¤erent compensation structures
may play an important sorting role.2 Lemieux et al. calculate that the interaction of structural
change and di¤erential returns accounts for 21% of the growth in the variance of male log-wages
over the period, and for 100% (or even more) above the 80th percentile. The United Kingdom saw
similar trends in the use of incentive pay, its skewness across hierarchical levels and its contribution
to rising income inequality. The fraction of establishments using some form of performance pay
thus rose from 41% in 1984 to 55% in 2004 (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). For the top 1% earners,
bonuses went from 26% of compensation in 2002 to 45% in 2008, and accounted for the entire gain
in their share of the total wage bill (from 7.4 to 8.9%; Bell and Van Reenen 2013).
The source of escalation in incentive pay in our model is increased competition for the best
workers, and this also ts well with the evidence on managerial compensation in advanced countries.
In a long-term study (1936-2003) of the market for top US executives, Frydman (2007) documents
a major shift, starting in the 1970s and sharply accelerating since the late 1980s, from rm-specic
skills to more general managerial ones e.g., from engineering degrees to MBAs. In addition, there
has been a concomitant rise in the diversity of sectoral experiences acquired over the course of a
typical career. Frydman argues that these decreases in mobility costs have intensied competition
for managerial skills and shows that, consistent with this view, executives with higher general
(multipurpose) human capital received higher compensation and were also the most likely to switch
companies. Using panel data on the 500 largest rms in Germany over 1977-2009, Fabbri and Marin
(2011) show that domestic and (to a lesser extent) global competition for managers has contributed
signicantly to the rise of executive pay in that country, particularly in the banking sector.
Our theory is based on competition not simply bidding up the level of compensation at the top,
but also signicantly altering its structure toward high-powered incentives, with a resulting shift
in the mix of tasks performed toward more easily quantiable and short-term-oriented ones. This
seems to be precisely what occurred on Wall Street as market-based compensation spread from the
emerging alternative-assets industry to the rest of the nancial world:
1Our theory is thus immune to the main arguments put forward by proponents of the e¢ cient-pay hypothesis,
namely that: (i) realized compensation seems highly related to rm stock performance (Kaplan and Rauh 2010,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2011); (ii) the say-on-pay requirement of the Dodd-Franck Act seems to have had little
e¤ect on executive pay, with most companiescompensation decisions receiving support from the general assembly.
2Consistent with this view and with our modelling premise that performance incentives a¤ect not only moral
hazard (e.g. Bandiera et al. 2007, Shearer 2004) but also selection, Lazears (2000) study of Safelite Glass Company
found that half of the 44% productivity increase reaped when the company replaced the hourly wage system by a
piece rate was due to in- and out-selection e¤ects.
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Talent quickly migrated from investment banks to hedge funds and private equity.
Investment banks, accustomed to attracting the most-talented executives in the world
and paying them handsomely, found themselves losing their best people (and their best
MBA recruits) to higher-paid and, for many, more interesting jobs... Observing the re-
markable compensation in alternative assets, sensing a signicant business opportunity,
and having to ght for talent with this emergent industry led banks to venture into
proprietary activities in unprecedented ways. From 1998 to 2006 principal and pro-
prietary trading at major investment banks grew from below 20% of revenues to 45%.
In a 2006 Investment DealersDigest article... one former Morgan Stanley executive
said... that extravagant hedge fund compensation widely envied on Wall Street, ac-
cording to many bankerswas putting upward pressure on investment banking pay, and
that some prop desks were even beginning to give traders "carry." Banks bought hedge
funds and private equity funds and launched their own funds, creating new levels of risk
within systemically important institutions and new conicts of interest. By 2007 the
transformation of Wall Street was complete. Faced with erce new rivals for business
and talent, investment banks turned into risk takers that compensated their best and
brightest with contracts embodying the essence of nancial-markets-based compensa-
tion.(Desai 2012, The Incentive Bubble).
In France, rising returns to talent account for the entire increase in the nance-sector wage
premium (from 8% in 1983 to 30% in 2011) among graduates of top engineering schools, as shown
by Célérier and Vallée (2014). In all sectors greater talent is also associated with a higher share of
variable pay, and the more so where the average return to talent is high, pointing to a strong link
between incentivization and competition for the best employees. Similar transformations have oc-
curred in the medical world with the rise of for-prot hospital chains in the United States: Gawande
(2009) documents the escalation of compensation driven by the overuse of revenue-generating tests
and surgeries, with parallel declines in preventive care and coordination on cases between specialists,
increases in costs and worse patient outcomes.
Further evidence comes from studies linking changes in the structure of pay to competitiveness
shocks originating in, or simultaneously a¤ecting, the product market. Whereas earlier theoretical
models of how product market competition a¤ects managerial incentives yielded ambiguous an-
swers, the data convey a very clear message. Across a variety of countries, industries, sectors and
hierarchical levels, exogenous decreases in barriers to competition consistently lead to signicant
increases in the fraction of pay that is variable and explicitly linked to performance. Moreover, and
importantly for our argument, much of the e¤ect arises through induced competition for talent in
the labor market.
Using a large panel of UK workers, Guadalupe (2007) shows that the 1992 EMS Single Market
Program (forcing a lowering of non-tari¤ trade barriers) and the 1996 appreciation of the British
Pound (by 20%) both increased within-industry returns to skills, in proportion to each sectors
exposure to the competitivity shock. Studying the compensation of U.S. executives, Cuñat and
Guadalupe (2009) show that import penetration of their industry (instrumented with exchange
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rates and tari¤s) increases the sensitivity of pay to company performance, while reducing the xed
component. It also widens pay di¤erentials between hierarchical levels, and specically raises the
return to talent, thus showing that rms exposed to greater foreign competition seek to hire more
talented executives. Using multiple measures of intra-industry competition, Karouna (2007) nds
the sensitivity of CEO pay to stock price to be positively related to product substitutability and
market size, and negatively related to entry costs. Focussing on the U.S. banking and nancial
sectors and using two major deregulation episodes as instruments, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2008)
nd in both cases that competition increased variable pay and in its performance sensitivity while
xed compensation fell, another prediction of our model.3
Many of these shocks and reforms simultaneously a¤ect an industrys good and skilled-labor
markets. For instance, allowing interstate banking intensies competition not only for deposits
and loans, but also for the managerial skills required to operate a branch or regional headquarters,
buy out and restructure in-state banks, etc. The same is true when entry costs fall or the size of
the market expands, and when foreign rms take advantage of a trade liberalization or currency
appreciation to set up and sta¤ distribution networks, dealerships and subsidiaries in a country
where they did not previously operate.
 Rising performance pay and declining work ethics. By their very nature, illegal and unethical
behaviors are di¢ cult to observe. Nonetheless, a number of recent studies and audit reports provide
evidence conrming the widespread perception of declining workplace ethics and rising malfeasance
Dyck et al. (2013) infer the prevalence of corporate fraud by exploiting the fact that, subsequent
to the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2001, rms that had used their services were forced to bring
in new auditors, who systematically cleaned housewhere problems had remained hidden. The
average publicly traded corporation is estimated to have a 14.5% probability of engaging in fraud
in any given year, with a sharp rise during the boom years of 1996 to 2002 and a decline following
the crash of the internet bubble (2002 to 2004).
In banking and nance, the rise of a nefarious bonus culturecomes out clearly in the surveys
commissioned by the securities-law rm Labaton Sucharow (2012, 2013) among employees of the
U.S. and U.K. nancial-services industries.4 In 2013, 29% of respondents believed that the rules
may have to be broken in order to be successful, and 24% deemed it likely that sta¤ in their
company had engaged in illegal or unethical activity; these gures were up by 17 and 14 percentage
points respectively over the 2012 survey. Most indicative of a profound, long-term regime shift,
according to both measures the proportion of cynics among younger employees (less than 10
years of experience) was more than double that of veterans (more than 20 years).5 Asked whether
they, personally, would be likely to engage in insider trading to make $10 million if there was
no chance of getting arrested, 24% of the 2013 respondents (up 9% from 2012) answered in the
3Focusing on a very di¤erent industry, Lo, Gosh and Lafontaine (2011) survey 1,500 sales managers of large US
manufacturing rms about the pay structure, job and individual characteristics of the sales representatives they
supervise. High-ability salespeople are more likely to work in rms that o¤er a higher incentive rate, and greater
product market competition is associated with more performance-based pay.
4For a general discussion of rising misbehavior and potential reforms of the banking industry, see Bolton (2013).
5Respectively, 36% versus 18%, and 35% versus 16%.
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a¢ rmative, with an enormous gap by tenure (38% versus 9%) pointing again to a landslide change
in culture. As to contributing causes, nally, 26% of the nancial-services professionals interviewed
believed that the compensation plans or bonus structures in place at their companies incentivized
employees to compromise ethical standards or violate the law, with again a major increase between
older and recent cohorts (31% versus 21%).
Similar conclusions about perverse incentives and their relation to talent wars were drawn in
the Salz Review (2013), an independent audit of Barclaysbusiness practices commissioned by its
board following a series of misdeeds (culminating with the LIBOR scandal) for which the company
was forced to pay several hundred million dollars in nes:
There was an over-emphasis on short-term nancial performance, reinforced by
remuneration systems that tended to reward revenue generation rather than serving the
interests of customers and clients... (§2.19, p. 7). Most but not all of the pay issues
concern the investment bank. To some extent, they reect the inevitable consequences
of determinedly building that business by hiring the best talent in a highly competitive
international market (and during a bubble period) into one of the leading investment
banks in the world(§2.29, p. 9).
Recommendations for reforms followed accordingly:
In all recruiting, but particularly for senior managers, Barclays should look be-
yond a candidates nancial performance, and include a rigorous assessment of their
t with Barclaysvalues and culture. Barclays should supplement this with induction
programmes that reinforce the values and standards to which the bank is committed
(§19, p. 16)... Barclaysapproach to reward should be much more broadly based than
pay, recognizing the role of non-nancial incentives wherever possible(§21, p.16).
In a very di¤erent but also increasingly competitive eld, namely scientic research, the number
of article retractions from journals listed in the Web of Science increased ten-fold between 1977
and 2010, while total articles published grew only by 44% (Van Noorden 2011). The fraction
of retractions due to fraud was estimated at about 50%. In more detailed studies focussing on
the biomedical and life sciences, Steen (2014) and Fang et al. (2012) found that misconduct
accounted for 75% of retractions for which a cause could be determined. Most importantly, the
share specically due to falsication or fabrication of resultshas grown considerably faster than
those due to plagiarism or self-plagiarism (where better detection tools have recently become
available) and scientic error, indicating that the explosive rise in article retractions does not
simply reect greater scrutiny by editors and readers.6
6Reinforcing this conclusion are the facts that: (i) time to retraction has actually increased rather than decreased;
(ii) it is only very weakly correlated with a journals impact factor, whereas the proportion of retractions due to
documented fraud is strongly correlated with it. The rise of high-powered (even winner-take-all) incentives for
researchers is put forward by all three studies as a key contributing factor in these developments.
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2 Model
2.1 Agents
 Preferences. A unit continuum of agents (workers) engage in two activities A and B, exerting
e¤orts (a; b) 2 R2+ respectively:
 Activity A is one in which individual contributions are not (easily) measurable and thus
cannot be part of a formal compensation scheme: long-term investments enhancing the rms
value, avoiding excessive risks and liabilities, cooperation, teamwork , etc. An agents contribution
to A is then driven entirely by his intrinsic motivation, va, linear in the e¤ort a exerted in this
task. In addition to a genuine preference to do the right thing (e.g., an aversion to ripping
o¤ shareholders or customers, selling harmful products, teaching shoddily, etc.), v can also reect
social and self-image concerns such as fear of stigma, an executives concern for his legacy, or
outside incentives not controlled by the rm, such as the risk of personal legal liability.7
Activity B; by contrast, is measurable and therefore contractible: individual output, sales,
short-term revenue, etc. When exerting e¤ort b; a workers productivity is + b, where  is a talent
parameter, privately known to each agent.8
The total e¤ort cost C(a; b) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in (a; b); with Cab > 0
unless otherwise noted, meaning that the two activities are substitutes. A particularly convenient
specication is the quadratic one, C(a; b) = a2=2+b2=2+ab; with 0 <  < 1; as it allows for simple
and explicit analytical solutions to the whole model.9 These are given in Appendix A, whereas in
the text we shall maintain a general cost function, except where needed to obtain further results.
We assume an a¢ ne compensation scheme with incentive power or bonus rate y and xed wage
z; so that total compensation is ( + b)y + z:10 Agents have quasi-linear preferences
U(a; b; ; y; z) = va+ ( + b) y + z   C(a; b): (1)
 Types. To emphasize the roles of heterogeneity in v and , respectively, we shall focus on two polar
cases. Here and throughout Section 6, agents di¤er only in their productivities. Thus  2 fL, Hg;
with respective probabilities (qL; 1  qL = qH) and   H   L > 0: In Section 7, conversely, we
shall consider agents who di¤er only in their intrinsic motivations v for task A:
 E¤ort allocation. When facing compensation scheme (y; z), the agent chooses e¤orts a(y) and
7Such preferences leading agents to provide some level of unrewarded e¤ort were part of Milgrom and Holmströms
original multitasking model (1991, Section 3). They make the analysis most tractable, while Section 6 extends it to
the case where both tasks are incentivized but A is measured with more noise than B or/and less discriminating of
worker talent. For recent analyzes of intrinsic motivation and social norms see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2003, 2006)
and Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006). On employeesloyalty and identication to their rm, see Akerlof and Kranton
(2005) and Ramalingam and Rauh (2010).
8The additive form of talent heterogeneity is chosen for analytical simplicity, as it implies that the rst-best power
of incentive is type-independent. Qualitatively similar results would obtain with the multiplicative form b; as long
as type heterogeneity in  is not so high that the rst-best set of contracts becomes incentive-compatible.
9 The model also works when the two tasks are complements; Cab < 0 (e.g.,  1 <  < 0) but the results in this
case are less interesting, e.g., competition is now, predictably, always more e¢ cient than monopsony.
10Unrestricted nonlinear schemes (as in La¤ont and Tirole 1986)yield very similar results; see online Appendix C.
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b(y) so as to maximize (1), leading to the rst-order conditions @C=@a = v; @C=@b = y: Our
assumptions on the cost function imply that increasing the power of the incentive scheme raises
e¤ort in the measured task and decreases it in the unobserved one: da =dy < 0 < db=dy: It will
prove convenient to decompose the agents utility into an allocative term, u(y); which depends
on the endogenous e¤orts, and a redistributiveone, y + z, which does not:
U(y; ; z)  U(a(y); b(y); ; y; z) = u(y) + y + z; (2)
where
u(y)  va(y) + yb(y)  C(a(y); b(y)): (3)
Note that u0(y) = b(y) and @U(y; ; z)=@y =  + b(y):
 Outside opportunities. We assume that any agent can obtain a reservation utility U , so that
employers must respect the participation constraint:
U(y; ; z) = u(y) + y + z  U: (4)
The type-independence of the outside option is a polar case that will help highlight the e¤ects of
competition inside the labor market. Thus, under monopsony every one has reservation utility equal
to U , whereas with competition reservation utilities become endogenous and type-dependent.11
2.2 Firm(s)
A worker of ability  exerting e¤orts (a; b) generates a gross revenue Aa+B(+b) for his employer.
Employing such an agent under contract (y; z) thus results in a net prot of
(; y; z) = (y) + (B   y)    z; (5)
where
(y)  Aa(y) + (B   y) b(y): (6)
represents the allocative component and (B   y)   z a purely redistributive one.
2.3 Social Welfare
In order to better highlight the mechanism at work in the model, we take as our measure of social
welfare the sum of workersand employerspayo¤s, thus abstracting from any externalities on the
rest of society.12 Again, it will prove convenient to decompose it into an allocative part, w(y), and
11We make the usual assumption that when a worker is indi¤erent between an employers o¤er and his reservation
utility he chooses the former. We also assume that U is high enough that z  0 in equilibrium (under any degree of
competition), but not so large that hiring some worker type is unprotable (see Appendix D for the exact conditions).
12For instance, we can think of rms output as being sold on a perfectly competitive product market. It is,
however, very easy to incorporate social spillovers into the analysis, as we explain below.
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a surplus, B, that is independent of the compensation scheme (the transfer (+ b)y+ z nets out):
W (; y)  U(a(y); b(y); ; y; z) + (; y; z) = w(y) +B; (7)
where
w(y)  u(y) + (y) = (A+ v) a(y) +Bb(y)  C(a(y); b(y)): (8)
Using the envelope theorem for the worker, u0(y) = b(y); we have:
w0(y) = Aa0(y) + (B   y) b0(y): (9)
We take w to be strictly concave, with a maximum at y < B given by
w0(y) = Aa0(y) + (B   y) b0(y) = 0 (10)
and generating enough surplus that even low types can be protably employed, namely
w(y) + LB > U: (11)
In cases where (underprovision of) the ethicalactivity a also has spillovers on the rest of society
be they technological (pollution), pecuniary (imperfect competition in the product market) or
scal (cost of government bailouts, taxes or subsidies)total social welfare becomes w(y)+ e  a(y),
where e is the per-unit externality. Clearly, this will only strengthen our main results about the
competitive overincentivization of the other activity, b:
3 Competing for Talent:
Throughout most of the paper (except for Section 7), v is known while  2 fH ; Lg is private
information, with mean   qLL + qHH :13 We rst consider the polar cases of monopsony and
perfect competition, which make most salient the basic forces at play, then study the full spectrum
of imperfect competition. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that if agentstypes i = H;L were
observable, the only impact of market structure would be on the xed wages zi; whereas incentives
would always remain at the e¢ cient level, yi = y:
13Asymmetric information about ability remains a concern even in dynamic settings where performance generates
ex-post signals about an agents type. First, such signals may be di¢ cult to accurately observe for employers other
than the current one, especially given the multi-task nature of production. Second, many factors can cause  to
vary unpredictably over the life-cycle: age (which a¤ects peoples abilities and preferences heterogeneously), health
shocks, private life issues, news interests and priorities, etc. Finally, di¤erent (imperfectly correlated) sets of abilities
typically become relevant at di¤erent stages of a career e.g., being a good trader or analyst, devising new securities,
bringing in clients, closing deals, managing a division, running and growing an international company, etc.
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3.1 Monopsony Employer
A monopsonist (or set of colluding rms) selects a menu of contracts (yi; zi) aimed at type i 2
fL;Hg. We assume that it wants to attract both types, which, as we will show, is equivalent to qL
exceeding some threshold. The rm thus maximizes expected prot
max
f(yi; zi)gi=H;L
( P
i=H;L
qi [(yi) + (B   yi)i   zi]
)
subject to the incentive constraints
u(yi) + iyi + zi  u(yj) + iyj + zj for all i; j 2 fH;Lg (12)
and the low types participation constraint, u(yL) + LyL + zL  U: This program is familiar from
the contracting literature. First, the combined incentive constraints yield (i   j)(yi   yj)  0 :
a more productive agent must receive a higher fraction of his measured output. Second, the low
types participation constraint is binding, and the high types rent above U is given by the extra
utility obtained by mimicking the low type: ()yL: Rewriting prots, the monopsonist solves:
max
f(yi; zi)gi=H;L
( P
i=H;L
qi [w(yi) +Bi]  U   qH()yL;
)
yielding ymH = y
(no distortion at the top) and14
w0(ymL ) =
qH
qL
; implying yL < y: (13)
The principal reduces the power of the low-types incentive scheme, so as to limit the high-types
rent. It is optimal for the rm to hire both types if and only if
qL

w(ymL ) +BL   U
  qHymL; (14)
meaning that the prots earned on low types exceed the rents abandoned to high types. By (13),
the di¤erence of the left- and right-hand sides is increasing in qL; so the condition is equivalent to
qL  qL; where qL is dened by equality in (14).
Proposition 1 (monopsony) Let (14) hold, so that the monopsonist wants to employ both types.
Then ymH = y
 and ymL < y
 is given by w0(ymL ) = (qH=qL); with corresponding xed payments
zmH =
U +ymL u(y)  Hy and zmL = U  u(ymL )  LymL : The resulting welfare loss is equal to
Lm = qL [w(y
)  w(ymL )] : (15)
14To exclude uninteresting corner solutions we shall assume that w0(0) > qH=qL. Since later on we shall impose
various other upper bounds on qH ; this poses no problem.
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It increases with , but need not be monotonic in A or B:
Note that since total social welfare is qH [w(yH) +BH ]+ qL [w(yL) +BL] ; a mean-preserving
increase in the distribution of  always reduces it, by worsening the informational asymmetry. In
contrast, an increase in A (or a decrease in B) has two opposing e¤ects on Lm : (i) it makes any
given amount of underincentivization on the B task less costly, as the alternative task A is now
more valuable; (ii) the e¢ cient bonus rate y given to the high types declines, and to preserve
incentive compatibility so must ymL ; worsening low typesunderincentivization. In the quadratic
case the two e¤ects cancel out, as shown in Appendix A.
3.2 Perfect Competition in the Labor Market
A large number of rms now compete for workers, each o¤ering an incentive-compatible menu
of contracts. We rst look for a separating competitive allocation, dened as one in which: (i)
each worker type chooses a di¤erent contract, respectively (yL; zL) and (yH ; zH) for i = H;L;
with resulting utilities UL and UH ; (ii) each of these two contracts makes zero prots, implying
in particular the absence of any cross-subsidy. One can then can indi¤erently think of each rm
o¤ering a menu and employing both types of workers, or of di¤erent rms specializing in a single
type by o¤ering a unique contract. Then, in a second stage, we investigate the conditions under
which this allocation is indeed an equilibrium, and even the unique one.
In a separating competitive equilibrium, any contract that operates must make zero prot:
(H ; yH ; zH) = 0 () (yH) + (B   yH) H = zH ; (16)
(L; yL; zL) = 0 () (yL) + (B   yL) L = zL; (17)
which pins down zH and zL. Furthermore, a simple Bertrand-like argument implies that the low
type must receive his symmetric-information e¢ cient allocation,15
ycL = y
 and zcL = (y
) + (B   y)L:
He should then not benet from mimicking the high type, nor vice-versa,
w(y) +BL  u(yH) + LyH + zH = w(yH) +BH   yH; (18)
w(yH) +BH  w(y) +BL + y; (19)
implying in particular that yH  y: Among all such contracts, the most attractive to the high
15Absent cross-subsidies, the low type cannot receive more than the total surplus w(y) + LB he generates under
symmetric information, or else his employer would make a negative prot. Were he to receive less, conversely, another
rm could attract him by o¤ering (y; zL = zcL   ") for " small, leading to a prot " on this type (and an even larger
one on any high type who also chose this contract). Low types must thus be o¤ered utility equal to w(y) + LB;
which only their symmetric-information e¢ cient allocation achieves.
12
types is the one involving minimal distortion, namely such that (18) is an equality
w(ycH)  w(y)  (B   ycH): (20)
By strict concavity of w; this equation has a unique solution ycH to the right of y
; satisfying
y < ycH < B: The inequality in (19) is then strict, meaning that only the low types incentive
constraint is binding. Note that, as illustrated in Figure I, this is exactly the reverse of what
occurred under monopsony.
Figure I: Distortions under monopsony and perfect competition
The intuition for this reversal is simple. A rm with monopsony power seeks to capture the
rents of its workers, who cannot seek a better deal from a competitor. For the less productive
types it achieves this (UL = U) through a low enough xed wage zL, but for the more productive
ones its ability to keep UH low via zH is limited by the fact that they could always pretend to
be L types, thereby achieving U + yL: To extract rents from the most productive agents, the
rm must therefore o¤er a low rate of variable pay yL; so as to make this mimicking strategy
unappealing. Competing employers, by contrast, seek to attract the workers by o¤ering them high
rents, UH ; they cannot increase xed compensation zH too much, however, otherwise L types would
masquerade as H, achieving utility UH   yH: To deter such behavior, rms must compensate
high-productivity agents mostly with a high bonus rate yH ; while limiting their xed pay.
 Existence and uniqueness. When is this least-cost separating (LCS) allocation indeed an equilib-
rium, or the unique equilibrium of the competitive-o¤er game? The answer, which is reminiscent
of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), hinges on whether or not a rm could protably deviate to a
contract that achieves greater total surplus by using a cross-subsidy from high to low types to
ensure incentive compatibility.
Denition 1 An incentive-compatible allocation f(Ui ; yi )gi=H;L is interim e¢ cient if there exists
no other incentive-compatible f(Ui; yi)gi=H;L that:
(i) Pareto dominates it: UH  UH ; UL  UL; with at least one strict inequality.
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(ii) Makes the employer(s) break even on average: iqi[w(yi) + iB   Ui]  0:
For the LCS allocation to be an equilibrium, it must be interim e¢ cient. Otherwise, there is
another menu of contracts that Pareto dominates it, which one can always slightly modify (while
preserving incentive-compatibility) so that both types of workers and the employer share in the
overall gain; o¤ering such a menu then yields strictly positive prots. The converse result is also
true: under interim e¢ ciency there can clearly be no positive-prot deviation that attracts both
types of agents, and by a similar type of surplus-sharing argument one can also exclude those that
attract a single type. These claims are formally proved in the appendix, where we also show that
when the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient, it is in fact the unique equilibrium. Furthermore, we
identify a simple condition for this to be case:
Lemma 1 The least-cost separating allocation is interim e¢ cient if and only if
qHw
0(ycH) + qL  0: (21)
This condition holds whenever qL exceeds some threshold ~qL < 1:
The intuition is as follows. At the LCS allocation, we saw that the binding incentive constraint
is the low types: U cL = U
c
H   ycH: Consider now an employer who slightly reduces the power of
the high types incentive scheme, yH =  "; while using lump-sum transfers zH = (b(yH) + H)"
+"2 to slightly more than compensate them for the reduction in incentive pay, and zL = "+ "2
to preserve incentive compatibility. Such a deviation attracts both types (UH = UL = "2, since
u0(y) = b(y)) and its rst-order impact on prots is
qH
 
0(yH)  H

yH   zH
  qLzL = qH w0(ycH) + qL ( ")
Under (21) this net e¤ect is strictly negative, hence the deviation unprotable. When (21) fails,
conversely, the increase in surplus generated by the more e¢ cient e¤ort allocation of the high types
is su¢ cient to make the rm and all its employees strictly better o¤. A higher qL = 1  qH means
fewer high types to generate such a surplus and more low types to whom rents (cross-subsidies)
must be given to maintain incentive compatibility, thus making (21) more likely to hold.
We can now state this sections main result.
Proposition 2 (perfect competition) Let qL  ~qL: The unique competitive equilibrium involves
two separating contracts, both resulting in zero prot:
1. Low-productivity workers get (y; zcL); where z
c
L is given by (17).
2. High-productivity ones get (ycH ; z
c
H); where z
c
H is given by (16) and y
c
H > y
 by
w(y)  w(ycH) = (B   ycH):
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3. The e¢ ciency loss relative to the social optimum is
Lc = qH [w(y
)  w(ycH)] = (B   ycH) qH: (22)
It increases with  and A, but need not be monotonic in B:
These results conrm and formalize the initial intuition that competition for talent will result
in an overincentivization of high-ability types. As shown on Figure I, this is the opposite distortion
from that of the monopsony case, which featured underincentivization of low-ability types. When
the degree of competition is allowed to vary continuously (Section 4), we therefore expect that there
will be a critical point at which the nature of the distortion (reecting which incentive constraint
is binding) tips from one case to the other.
 Skill-biased technical change. New technologies and organizational forms that raise the relative
productivity of more skilled workers are generally seen as playing a major role in the rise of wage
inequality. Implicit in most models and discussions is the premise that this is the distributional
downside of important gains in productive e¢ ciency. Sometimes this is even explicit, as in the
accounts of superstar or CEO compensation by proponents of the e¢ cient-pay hypothesis (e.g.,
Rosen 1981, Gabaix and Landier 2008, Kaplan and Rauh 2010). Our results also call this view
into question. A higher H exacerbates the competition for talented agents, resulting in a higher
bonus rate ycH that makes their performance-based pay rise more than proportionately to their
marginal product. This market response to technical change is ine¢ cient, however, as it worsens
the underprovision of long-term investments and prosocial e¤orts inside rms, thereby reducing the
social value of the productivity increase. For a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of s,
such as information technologies that substitute for low-skill labor and complements high skills,
only the deadweight loss remains, so overall social welfare actually declines.
What happens when the LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient, that is, when qL < ~qL? We saw
that it is then not an equilibrium, since there exist protable deviations to incentive-compatible
contracts (involving cross-subsidies) that Pareto-dominate it. We also show in the appendix that
no other pure-strategy allocation is immune to deviations, a situation that closely parallels the
standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) problem: the only equilibria are in mixed strategy.16 Since
such an outcome is not really plausible as a stable labor-market outcome, we assume from here on
qL  maxf~qL; qLg  qL: (23)
16An alternative approach is to assume that it is workers who make take-it-or-leave o¤ers, instead of a competitive
industry making o¤ers to them. From Maskin and Tirole (1992) we know that for qL  ~qL; the unique equilibrium of
the resulting informed-principal game is the LCS allocation, so the result is the same as here with competitive o¤ers.
By contrast, for qL < ~qL; the set of equilibrium interim utilities is the set of feasible utilities (incentive compatible and
satisfying budget balance in expectation) that Pareto dominate (UcL, U
c
H). A second alternative is to use a di¤erent
equilibrium concept from the competitive screening literature, as in Scheuer and Netzer (2010); again, this has no
bearing on the region where the separating equilibrium exists. A third alternative would be to introduce search, free
entry by principals and contract posting as in Guerrieri et al. (2010). Self-selection then makes type proportions
among searchers in the market endogenous, in such a way that a separating equilibrium always exists.
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3.3 Welfare: Monopsony versus Perfect Competition
 Single task (A = 0). As a benchmark, it is useful to recall that competition is always socially
optimal with a single task. The competitive outcome is then the single contract yc = y = B; zc =
0 : agents of either type are residual claimants for their production and therefore choose the e¢ cient
e¤ort allocation.17 Monopsony, by contrast, leads to a downward distortion in the power of the
incentive scheme. Hence competition is always strictly welfare superior.
 Multitasking. From (15) and (20), Lm < Lc if and only if
qL [w(y
)  w(ymL )] < qH [w(y)  w(ycH)] : (24)
Consider rst the role of labor force composition. As seen from (13) and (20), the monopsony
incentive distortion y   ymL is increasing with qH=qL (limiting the high typesrents becomes more
important), whereas the competitive one, ycH   y is independent of it (being determined by an
incentive constraint). For small qH=qL; Lm=Lc is thus of order qL (qH=qL)
2 =qH = qH=qL; so (24)
holds provided qL is high enough. With quadratic costs, we obtain an exact threshold that brings
to light the role of the other forces at play.
Proposition 3 (welfare) Let C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab: Social welfare is lower under compe-
tition than under monopsony if and only if qL  qL and
qH
2qL
+
r
qH
qL
<


1  2

A


: (25)
The underlying intuitions are quite general.18 First, competition entails a larger e¢ ciency loss
when the unrewarded task long-run investments, cooperation, avoidance of excessive risks, etc.
is important enough and the two types of e¤ort su¢ ciently substitutable. If they are comple-
ments ( < 0); in contrast, competition is always e¢ ciency-promoting. Second, the productivity
di¤erential  scales the severity of the asymmetric-information problem that underlies both the
monopsony and the competitive distortions. A monopsonistic rm optimally trades o¤ total surplus
versus rent-extraction, so (by the envelope theorem) a small  has only a second-order e¤ect on
overall e¢ ciency. Under competition the e¤ect is rst-order, because a rm raising its yH does not
internalize the deterioration in the workforce quality it inicts on its competitors or, equivalently,
the fact that in order to retain their talent they will also have to distort incentives and the
allocation of e¤ort. This intuition explains why (25) is more likely to hold when  decreases.19
17Similar results holds if A > 0 but v = 0 : since a  0 for all y; the socially optimal bonus rate is y = B; even
though it results in an ine¢ cient e¤ort allocation. This is clearly also the competitive outcome.
18 In particular, the models solution with quadratic costs (given in Appendix A) also correspond to Taylor approx-
imations of the more general case when  is small, provided 1=(1  2) is replaced everywhere by  w00(y):
19As shown in Appendix B, for small the lower bound ~qL above which (21) holds (and the competitive equilibrium
thus exists) is such that 1  ~qL is of order
p
: Thus, to rigorously apply the above reasoning involving rst- versus
second-order losses for small ; one needs to also let qH become small. This further reduces y   ymL while leaving
ycH   y unchanged. This, in turn, further raises Lc=Lm; making it of order () 3=2 rather than () 1 :
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4 Imperfect Competition
4.1 A Full-SpectrumHotelling Model
To understand more generally how the intensity of labor market competition a¤ects the equilibrium
structure of wages, workers task allocation, rmsprots and social welfare, we now develop a
variant of the Hotelling model in which competitiveness can be varied continuously over the whole
range from pure monopsony to perfect competition. The multitask-adverse-selection contracting
problem is then embedded into this general setting.
As illustrated in Figure II, a unit continuum of agents is uniformly distributed along the unit
interval, x 2 [0; 1] : Two rms, k = 0; 1; are located respectively at the left and right extremities and
recruit workers to produce, with the same production function as before. When a worker located
at x chooses to work for Firm 0 (resp., 1), he incurs a cost equal to the distance tx (resp., t(1 x))
that he must travel. We assume that  and x are independent and that a workers position is not
observable by employers, who therefore cannot condition contracts on this characteristic.
In the standard Hotelling model, agents also have an outside option (e.g., staying put) that yields
a xed level of utility, U: This implies, however, that a change in t a¤ects not only competitiveness
within the market (rm 1 vs. 2) but also, mechanically, that of the outside option formally,
agentsparticipation constraints. To isolate the pure competitiveness of the market from that of
other activities, we introduce an intuitive but novel modeling device, ensuring in particular that
the market is always fully covered.
Figure II: full-spectrum Hotelling model
 Co-located outside option. Instead of receiving the outside option U for free, agents must also go
and get itat either end of the unit interval, which involves paying the same cost tx or t(1 x) as if
they chose Firm 0 or Firm 1; respectively. One can think of two business districts, each containing
both a multitask rm of the type studied here and a competitive fringe or informal sector in which
all agents have productivity U:20
Without loss of generality, we can assume that each rm k = 0; 1 o¤ers an incentive-compatible
menu of compensation schemes fyki ; zki gi=H;L; in which workers who opt for this employer self-select.
Let Uki denote the utility provided by rm k to type i :
20Alternatively, each agent could produce U at home but then have to travel (or adapt his human capital) to
one or the other marketplace to sell his output.
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Uki  u(yki ) + iyki + zki : (26)
A worker of type i; located at x; will choose rm k = 0 if and only if
Uki   tx  max
n
U   tx; U   t(1  x); U `i   t(1  x)
o
: (27)
The rst inequality reduces to Uki  U : a rm must at least match its local outside option. If both
attract L-type workers, U `i  U as well, so the third inequality makes the second one redundant.
We shall focus the analysis on the (unique) symmetric equilibrium, in which each rm attracts
half of the total labor force. To simplify the exposition, we take it here as given that: (i) each
rm prefers to employ positive measures of both types of workers than to exclude either one;
(ii) conversely, neither rm wants to corner the market on any type of worker, i.e. move the
corresponding cuto¤ value of x all the way to 0 or 1: In Appendix D we show that neither exclusion
nor cornering can be part of a best response by a rm to its competitor playing the strategy
characterized in Proposition 4 below, as long as
qL  qL; (28)
where qL 2 [qL; 1) is another cuto¤, independent of t: Assuming (28) from here on, we can focus
on utilities
 
Uki ; U
`
i

resulting in interior cuto¤s, so that rm ks share of workers of type i is
xki

Uki ; U
`
i

=
1
2
+
Uki   U `i
2t
: (29)
The rm then chooses (UL; UH ; yL; yH) to solve the program:
max
n
qH(UH   U `H + t)[w(yH) + HB   UH ] + qL(UL   U `L + t)[w(yL) + LB   UL]
o
(30)
subject to the constraints (with Lagrange multipliers in parentheses):
UH  UL + yL (H) (31)
UL  UH   yH (L) (32)
UL  U () (33)
To shorten the notation, let i  w(yi)+iB Ui denote the rms prot margin on type i = H;L:
The rst-order conditions, together with the symmetric-equilibrium condition Ui = U `i ; are:
qH(H   t) + H   L = 0 (34)
qL(L   t) + L   H +  = 0 (35)
tqHw
0(yH) + L = 0 (36)
tqLw
0(yL)  H = 0: (37)
Note that H and L cannot both be strictly positive: otherwise (31) and (32) would bind, hence
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yH = yL; rendering (36)-(37) mutually incompatible. This suggests that only one or the other
incentive constraint will typically bind at a given point.
 Constructing the equilibrium: key intuitions. Solving the above problem over all values of t
is quite complicated, so we shall focus here on the underlying intuitions. The solution to (31)-
(37) is formally derived in Appendix B; because the objective function (30) is not concave on the
relevant space for (UL; UH ; yL; yH); Appendix D (online) then provides a constructive proof that
this allocation is indeed the global optimum. These and other technical complexities (exclusion,
cornering) are the reasons why we conne our analysis to the symmetric separating equilibrium.
(a) For large t; the equilibrium should resemble the monopsonistic one: the main concern is
limiting high typesrent, so rms distort yL < y = yH to make imitating low types unattractive.
Conversely, for small t; the equilibrium should resemble perfect competition: the main concern is
attracting the H types, leading employers to o¤er them high-powered incentives, yH > y = yL:
(b) As t declines over the whole real line, the high typesresponsiveness to higher o¤ered utility
UH rises, so rms are forced to leave them more rent. Since that rent is either yL or yH
(depending on which of the above two concerns dominates, i.e. on which typesincentive constraint
is binding), yL and yH must both be nonincreasing in t:
(c) Firms 0 and 1 are always actively competing for the high types. If t is low enough, they also
compete for L types, o¤ering them a surplus above their outside option: UL > U: At the threshold
t1 below which UL starts exceeding U; yH has a convex kink: since the purpose of keeping yH above
y is to maintain a gap UH  UL = yH just su¢ cient to dissuade low types from imitating high
ones, as UL begins to rise above U; the rate of increase in yH can be smaller.
These intuitions translate into a characterization of the equilibrium in terms of three regions,
illustrated in Figure III and formally stated in Proposition 4.21
Figure III: equilibrium incentives under imperfect competition
21With quadratic costs one can show (see Appendix A) that each of the curves is convex, as drawn in the gure.
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Proposition 4 (imperfect competition) Let qL  qL: There exist unique thresholds t1 > 0 and
t2 > t1 such that, in the unique symmetric market equilibrium:
1. Region I (strong competition): for all t < t1; bonuses are yL = y < y^IH(t); strictly decreasing
in t; starting from y^IH(0) = y
c
H : The low types participation constraint is not binding, UL
> U; while his incentive constraint is: UH   UL = y^IH(t):
2. Region II (medium competition): for all t 2 [t 1; t2); bonuses are yL = y < y^IIH (t); with
y^IIH (t) < y^
I
H(t) except at t1 and strictly decreasing in t: The low types participation constraint
is binding, UL = U; and so is his incentive constraint: UH   UL = y^IIH (t):
3. Region III (weak competition): for all t  t2; bonuses are yL = y^L(t) < y = yH ; with y^L(t)
strictly decreasing in t and lim
t!+1 y^L(t) = y
m
L : The low types participation and the high types
incentive constraints are binding : UL = U; UH   UL = y^L(t):
 Welfare. For each value of t, either yL or yH is equal to the (common) rst-best value y; while
the other bonus rate, which creates the distortion, is strictly decreasing in t: Recalling from (7)-(8)
that W = qHw(yH) + qLw(yL) +B; we thus have, as illustrated on Figure IV:
Proposition 5 (optimal degree of competition) Social welfare is hill-shaped as a function of
the degree of competition in the labor market, reaching the rst-best at t2 = w(y)+H(B y)+Ly;
where yL = y = yH:
Figure IV: competition and social welfare
Note that we do not subtract fromW the total mobility cost t=4 incurred by agents (equivalently,
we add it to their baseline utility), as it is paid even when neither rm attracts workers, who instead
all fetch the nearest outside option. This is also consistent with using t as a measure of pure market
competitiveness, without introducing an additional wealth e¤ect. In particular, it is required to
yield back the monopsony levels of utility as t! +1:22
22One can think of t as a tax on mobility rebated to agents, or as the prots of a monopolistic transportation or
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 International di¤erences. Another interesting interpretation of t is as an index of labor and/or
product market regulation. Besides direct restrictions on occupational mobility and entry (certi-
cation, licensing or nationality requirements, etc.) this also includes limits on pay-for-performance
(or ring for misperformance) imposed by unions, civil-service rules or social norms. A number of
European countries can thus be thought of as having many sectors situated in Region III, where
less productive workers are underincentivized and more competition and deregulation would be
benecial. Conversely, important sectors in the US and UK, particularly nance, t the description
of Regions I-II; high skill workers are overincentivized and greater competition for talent, spurred
for instance by deregulation, further aggravates the bonus culture.23
4.2 Inequality
We next examine how the gains and losses in total welfare (under either denition) are distributed
among the di¤erent actors in the market.
Proposition 6 (individual welfare and rm prots) As the labor market becomes more com-
petitive (t declines), both UH and UL increase (weakly for the latter), but inequality in workers
utilities, UH   UL always strictly increases; rmstotal prots strictly decline.
In Regions III and II, UL = U: In Region I, UL is decreasing in t, as we show in the appendix.
Since (UH   UL) = is equal to y^H(t) over Regions I and II and to y^L(t) over Region III, it follows
directly from Proposition 4 that @UH=@t  @ (UH   UL) =@t < 0: As to prots, they must clearly
fall as t declines over Regions II and I, since overall surplus is shrinking but all workers are gaining.
In Region III, Fernandes et as y^L(t) rises rms reap some of the e¢ ciency gains from low-type
agents more e¢ cient e¤ort allocation, but the rents they must leave to high types increase even
faster (as shown in the appendix), so total prots decline here as well.
 Income inequality. Consider now the e¤ects of a more competitive labor market on earnings,
which is what is measured in practice. For most sectors in a market economy the empirically
relevant range is that of medium to high mobility, namely Regions I-II in Figure III. Indeed, this is
where rms are more concerned with retaining and bidding away from each other the workers of
high ability who can easily switch (x close to 1=2) than with exploiting their captivelocal labor
force (x close to 0 or 1): Region III, in contrast is particularly relevant to public-sector employment
and, more generally, to countries and industries with heavily regulated labor markets. We compare
how the two types of workers i = H;L fare in terms of total earnings Yi  [b(yi) + i] yi + zi; as
well as the separate contributions of performance-based and xed pay.
human-capital-adaptation sector with zero marginal cost, engaged in limit pricing against a competitive fringe with
marginal cost t: Alternatively, in contexts where variations in t also involve a net resource cost, one could subtract it
from social welfare (as in Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr 1999). In Appendix A we show that increases in t can raise
aggregate welfare even under this more demanding denition.
23Fernandes et al. (2012) nd large variations across countries in the use of incentive pay for CEOs, which they
attribute to di¤erences in the weight of institutional shareholders and independent boards. Our model shows that
these could also reect di¤erences in labor market institutions a¤ecting the competition for executive talent. Corollary
1 below provides a simple test of which side of the optimum a given sector is on.
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Proposition 7 (income inequality) Let qL  qL: As the labor market becomes more competitive
(t declines), both YH and YL increase (weakly for the latter). Furthermore,
1. Over Regions I and II (medium and high competition), inequality in total pay YH   YL rises,
as does its performance-based component. Inequality in xed wages declines, so changes in
performance pay account for more than 100% of the rise in total inequality.
2. Over Region III (low competition), inequality in performance pay declines, while inequality in
xed wages rises. As a result, inequality in total pay need not be monotonic. With quadratic
costs, a su¢ cient condition for it to rise as t declines is B  A+ (1  2):
These results are broadly consistent with the ndings of Lemieux et al. (2009) about the driving
role of performance pay in rising earnings inequality, as well as their hypothesis that the increased
recourse to performance pay also serves a screening purpose. They are also in line with Frydmans
(2007) evidence linking increased mobility (skills portability) of corporate executives to the rise in
both the level and the variance in their compensation.24 The above properties also imply that the
fraction of the income di¤erential YH   YL that is due to incentive pay, 1  (zH   zL)=(YH   YL);
is U -shaped in t and minimized at t2; where it equals 1: Whereas this value reects the specic
assumption (additive separability of talent and e¤ort) making the rst-best incentive rate y type-
independent, the U shape is a more robust result of competitions opposing e¤ects on the two types
incentive constraints. For this reason we state the next result in terms of changes rather than levels.
Corollary 1 (testing for e¢ ciency) An increase in market competition reduces (raises) aggre-
gate e¢ ciency when it is accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the share of earnings inequality
accounted for by performance-based pay.
This result provides a simple test, based on observables, to assess whether competition is in
the range where it is benecial, or detrimental. Subject to the caveats inherent in interpreting
empirical data through the lens of a simple, two-type model, the evidence discussed earlier points
to the latter case, especially as ones gets into the upper deciles and then centiles of the earnings
distribution (top 80%, executive pay, nancial sector, etc.).
4.3 Human Capital Investment and Worker Sorting
 Endogenous skill distribution. Let the cost to a marginal worker of acquiring high skills, given
that a fraction qH already have, be G0(qH); where the aggregate aggregate cost G(qH) is such that
G(0) = G0(0) = 0; G0 > 0 and G0(qH) > ycH; where qH  1  qL and qL is given by (28).
Given a utility di¤erential UH   UL > 0; the supply of H types is qH = (G0) 1(UH   UL) 2
(0; qH): On the demand side, employer competition leads to a skill premium of UH   UL = yH
in Regions I-II and UH   UL = yL in Region III, which we show in appendix to be everywhere
decreasing in qH ; as one would expect. Recalling from Proposition 7 that it is also strictly decreasing
in t leads to the following results.
24See also Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), Bell and Van Reenen (2013) and Frydman and Saks (2005).
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Proposition 8 When workers can invest in human capital:
1. The fraction of high-skill workers qH(t) is the unique solution to G(qH) = (yH yL)(qH ; t);
lies in (0; qH) and is strictly increasing with competition (declines with t over R+):
2. Social welfare, ~W (t) = W (t; qH(t))   G(qH(t)); is again maximized at an interior level of
competition, ~t2 2 (0; t2): In particular, perfect competition is locally and globally suboptimal.
The intuition for the rst result is familiar: competition for talent protects workers from the
expropriation of their human-capital investment, and thus spurs the acquisition of skills. Consider
next the welfare e¤ects of a small increase in qH : At xed bonuses (yH ; yL); a marginal worker
acquiring high skills increases productive surplus by w(yH)  w(yL) +B but only appropriates
UH  UL; compensating for his investment cost G0(qH): His employer thus reaps extra prot H  
L  0; with strict inequality except at t = 0; where H = L = 0: A marginal high-skill worker
also contributes to reducing the skill premium (lowering yH or raising yL), and this pecuniary
externality alleviates the multi-task distortion at each rm, except at t = 0; where we show that
@yH=@qH = 0: Each worker who invests thus generates two positive externalities, and more of them
do as t falls, so the socially optimal level of competition is higher than with xed types: ~t2 < t2:
As one approaches perfect competition, however, both externalities vanish, leaving only the bonus
culturedistortion. Therefore, ~W 0(0) > 0 and ~t2 > 0; demonstrating the robustness of our main
conclusions to an endogenous distribution of skills.25
 Firm heterogeneity and worker sorting. While we have focussed here on a symmetric equilibrium,
our main results are also robust to workers sorting di¤erentially across rms. This is most easily
seen in the case of perfect competition (t = 0):26 As noted earlier, the equilibrium allocation can
then indi¤erently be achieved as the symmetric outcome of Bertrand competition among two (or
more) rms, or as an equilibrium in which a fraction qH of rms employ only H types and the
remaining fraction qL only L types. Proposition 3, which provides a simple condition determining
when monopsony or competition is more e¢ cient, applies to both cases.27
5 Regulating Compensation
 Bonus caps. We focus here on the case of perfect competition, for which the issue is most
relevant. When the regulator is able to di¤erentiate between the performance-based and xed parts
25The result is weaker only in the sense that net social welfare need no longer be hump-shaped over R+: It rises at
t = 0 and is decreasing everywhere to the right of t2; but could have multiple local maxima in-between.
26Allowing for asymmetric outcomes or heterogenous technologies in the full-edged Hotelling model with adverse
selection and multitasking is di¢ cult, and left to further work.
27One can also eliminate the indeterminacy in rmscomposition. Let there be a continuum of potential employers,
with common A but B distributed according to a cdf H(B) on some interval [B;+1); with a mass of at least qL at
B and a positive density on (B;+1): In a competitive equilibrium, all L agents work in rms with B = B; receiving
the bonus yL = y and a wage zL that absorbs all remaining prot; all H agents, meanwhile, work in rms with
B  B  H 1(qL); receiving a distorted bonus yH(B) > y and a wage zH(B) making them indi¤erent among
employers, while zH(B) absorbs all prots of the marginal rm. The same reasoning as that preceding Proposition
3, again shows that for qH small enough, the e¢ ciency loss under monopsony is smaller than under competition.
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of compensation, and absent other margins that could be distorted, policy can be very e¤ective. As
shown below, if bonuses are capped at y the only equilibrium is a pooling one in which all rms
o¤er, and all workers take, the single contract (y; (y) + (B   y)); thus restoring the rst best.
In practice, things may not be so simple. For instance, rms might switch to alternative forms
of rewards that, at the margin, appeal di¤erentially to di¤erent types but are even less e¢ cient
screening devices than performance bonuses. Plausible examples include latitude to serve on other
companiesboards, to engage in own practice (doctors) or consulting (academics), and lower lock-in
to company (low clawbacks, easier terms for quitting). Let $1 paid in the alternative currency
yield utility $i to a type-i employee, with L < H < 1: We assume that, absent regulation,
employers prefer to use incentive pay rather than ine¢ cient transfers to screen workers:
 w0(ycH)

<
1  H

; (38)
where   H   L:28 Suppose now that regulation constrains bonuses, y  y; and consider
a rm that leaves incentives unchanged but substitutes in high typescontract $1 of alternative
transfer for a $H reduction in zH ; it can then also reduce zL by $ while preserving incentive
compatibility. The strategy is protable if qH(1  H)  qL > 0; or
1  H

<
qL
qH
: (39)
Proposition 9 (bonus cap) Assume qL  qL and (38). Under a bonus cap at any y 2 [0; ycH ];
the unique competitive equilibrium has yL = minfy; yg  y and yH = y: Furthermore:
1. If (39) does not hold, alternative transfers are not used: H = L = 0; UH   UL = y and
zL zH = u(y) u(y)+L(y  y): As y is reduced from ycH to y the equilibrium still involves
separating contracts, but now with a growing cross-subsidy from high to low types, and welfare
strictly increases (in the Pareto sense), reaching rst-best at y = y: As y is reduced still
further the equilibrium becomes a pooling one, and welfare strictly decreases.
2. If (39) holds, the equilibrium is always a separating one. Low types receive their constrained-
symmetric-information contract (yL = y; zL = w(y)+(B  y)L) while high types get bonus
y; a non-monetary transfer H = [(B y)+w(y) w(y)]=(1 L) and a monetary transfer
zH = w(y)+(B   y) H yb(y) H : Social welfare is strictly decreasing (in the Pareto sense)
as y is reduced, and thus maximized when no binding regulation is imposed (y = ycH):
In the rst case, using the alternative currency to screen is too onerous: it entails a substantial
deadweight loss 1   H , or would have to be given in large amounts to achieve separation (
small), or to too many high types (qH=qL large). A bonus cap y < ycH will then successfully limit
28The left-hand side is the surplus gained on each high type when decreasing yH by $1=: This raises the low
types utility from mimicking by $1, so in order to preserve incentive-compatibility the high types contract must
include $1=() in the ine¢ cient currency, while zH is adjusted to keep UH unchanged. Monetary wages (xed plus
variable) thus decrease by $H=, resulting in a net cost equal to the right-hand side of (38), exceeding the benet.
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rms ability to poach each others high-skill workers through escalating incentive pay, without
triggering other distortions. Such a policy achieves Pareto improvements all the way down to
y = y; with the benets accruing to both types of workers as higher xed pay, which is the margin
where competition now takes place.
In the second case, rms increasingly substitute toward ine¢ cient transfers as the bonus cap is
reduced. By (38), even at ycH where the marginal bonus distortion is maximal, it is still smaller
than that from using the alternative currency. A fortiori, the further down y forces yH ; the less
is gained in productive e¢ ciency, while the marginal distortion associated with the alternative
screening device remains constant: a Pareto-worsening welfare loss.29
 Earnings caps. If rms are able to relabel xed and variable compensation, the only cap the
regulator can impose is on total earnings Y: As we show in Proposition 19 (see online Appendix D),
this leads to a set of results parallel to those obtained above for bonus regulation. When rms have
relatively easy access to alternative rewards allowing them to screen workers (meaning that (39)
holds; otherwise, alternative transfers are again not used, and regulation is e¢ cient), an earnings cap
Y leads to a constrained-LCS allocation in which: (i) low types receive their symmetric-information
contract (y; zL); (ii) high types get a packagewith bonus y
 < yrH < y
c
H ; a xed wage zH set so
that total pay adds up to Y ; and a nonmonetary transfer rH > 0: Any tightening of the earnings
cap (reduction in Y ) then lowers yrH but increases 
r
H ; resulting in a Pareto deterioration.
 Taxation. Although a conscatory tax of 100% above a ceiling Y is unambiguously welfare
reducing (under (38)-(39)), some positive amount of taxation is always optimal to improve on the
laissez-faire bonus culture. While characterizing the optimal tax in this setting is complicated
and left for future work, we can show:
Proposition 10 A small tax  on total earnings always improves welfare: dW=d j=0 > 0:
The intuition is as follows. To start with, condition (38) ensures that, for  su¢ ciently small,
the rm does not nd it protable to resort to ine¢ cient transfers, hence still uses performance pay
to screen workers. Taxing total earnings then has two e¤ects. First, under symmetric information,
it distorts (net) incentives downward from the private and social optimum, y: Second, it shrinks
the compensation di¤erential received by the two types under any given contract. This reduces low
typesincentive to mimic high ones, thus dampening rmsneed to screen through high-powered
(net) incentives and thereby alleviating the misallocation of e¤ort. For small  the rst e¤ect is of
second-order (a standard Harberger triangle), whereas the second one is of rst order, due again
to the externality between rms discussed earlier.
6 Multidimensional Incentives and Noisy Task Measurement
Performance in activity A was so far taken to be non-measurable or non-contractible. Consequently,
e¤ort a was driven solely by intrinsic motivation, or by xed outside incentives such as potential
29Allowing the ine¢ cient transfers to have increasing marginal cost (in the form of (1   H)= rising with H)
would combine the two cases.
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legal liability or reputational concerns. In the other version of the multitask problem studied by
Holmström and Milgrom (1991), every dimension of performance can be measured but with noise,
and this uncertainty limits the extent to which risk-averse agents can be incentivized. We now
extend our theory to this case, where there need not be any intrinsic motivation. This variant of
the model is particularly applicable to the issue of short- versus long-term performance and the
possible recourse to deferred compensation, clawbacks and other forms of long-term pay.
 Technology and preferences. Outputs in tasks A and B are now A + a + "A and B + b + "B,
where A, B are the employees talents in each one, a and b his e¤orts as before, and "A, "B
independent random shocks with "A  N (0; 2A) and "B  N (0; 2B): A compensation package is
a triple (yA; yB; z) where yA and yB are the bonuses on each task and z the xed wage. As in
Holmström and Milgrom (1991), agents have mean-variance preferences:
U(a; b; A; B; y; z) = (A + a)yA + (B + b)yB + z   C(a; b)  r
2

(yA)22A + (y
B)22B

; (40)
where r denotes the index of risk aversion and the cost function C has the same properties as
before. Given an incentive vector y  (yA; yB), the agent chooses e¤orts a(y) and b(y) that solve
Ca(a(y); b(y)) = y
A and Cb(a(y); b(y)) = yB: It is easily veried that a(y) is increasing in yA
and decreasing in yB; while b(y) has the opposite properties. The rms prot function remains
unchanged, so total surplus is w(y) +AA +BB, where the allocative component is now
w(y)  Aa(y) +Bb(y)  C(a(y); b(y))  r
2

(yA)22A + (y
B)22B

: (41)
Assuming strict concavity and an interior solution, the vector of rst-best bonuses y  (yA; yB)
solves the rst-order conditions:
@w
@yA
 
yA; yB

=
@w
@yB
 
yA; yB

= 0; (42)
which is shown in the appendix to imply that yA < A and yB < B:
There are again two types of workers, H and L, in proportions qH and qL; who each select their
preferred contract from the menus

(yAi ; y
B
i ; zi)
	
i=H;L
o¤ered by rms. Denoting y  yH   yL
and   H   L for each task  = A;B; incentive compatibility requires thatP
=A;B
(y )( )  0: (43)
To simplify the analysis, we assume H types to be more productive in both tasks: A  0 and
B > 0 (otherwise, which type is betterdepends on the slopes of the incentive scheme).
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 Monopsony. Denoting Di  AAi +BBi for i = H;L; a monopsonistic employer solves
max
f(Ui;yi)gi=H;L
fqH [w(yH) +DH   UH ] + qL [w(yL) +DL   UL]g; subject to
UL  U;
UH  UL + yALA + yBLB:
This yields ymH = y
, while ymL is given by
1
A
@w
@yA
(ymL ) =
1
B
@w
@yB
(ymL ) =  
qH
qL
: (44)
As before, the incentives of low types (only) are distorted downward, now in both activities. Note
also how the e¢ ciency losses, normalized by their o¤setting rent reductions, are equalized across
the two tasks. As before, one can show that it is indeed optimal to employ both types as long as
qL is above some cuto¤ qL < 1; which we shall assume.
 Perfect competition. We look again for a least-cost separating equilibrium. Denoting USIL 
w(y) +DL type Ls symmetric-information utility, such an allocation must solve:
max
f(Ui;yi)gi=H;L
fUHg; subject to
UH = w(yH) +DH ;
USIL  UH   yAHA   yBHB:
Let c denote the shadow cost of the second constraint. The rst-order conditions are then
1
A
@w(yH)
@yAH
=
1
B
@w(yH)
@yBH
=  c; (45)
while the binding incentive constraint takes the form
w(y)  w(yH) =
 
A  yAH

A +
 
B   yBH

B: (46)
Hence, a system of three equations determining (yA;cH ; y
B;c
H ; 
c); independently of the prior probabil-
ities, as usual for the LCS allocation. Clearly, high-ability agents are again overincentivized, now
in both tasks. Note also that even though competitive and monopsonistic rms use screening for
very di¤erent purposes, resulting in opposite types of distortions, both equalize those distortions
(properly normalized by unit rents) across the two tasks.
The LCS allocation is, once again, the (unique) equilibrium if and only if it is interim e¢ cient.
In the appendix we generalize Lemma 1 to show:
Lemma 2 The LCS allocation ycH is interim e¢ cient if and only if
1
A
@w(ycH)
@yAH
=
1
B
@w(ycH)
@yBH
   qL
qH
(47)
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or, equivalently, c  qL=qH :
This condition generalizes (21) and has the same interpretation, which can now be given in
terms of either task. Intuitively, the larger the distortion in the partial derivatives, the higher
the welfare loss relative to rst best; condition (47) requires that it not be so large as to render
protable a deviation to a more e¢ cient contract sustained by cross-subsidies.
 Welfare. To demonstrate the robustness of our main result competition for talent can be
excessive, resulting in signicant e¢ ciency lossesto both tasks being incentivized and performed
only for money, it su¢ ces to compare again monopsony and perfect competition. As before, a
simple su¢ cient condition for Lm = qL [w(y)  w (ymL )] < qH [w(y)  w(ycH)] = Lc is, that qH=q
be small enough. Indeed w(y)   w(ycH) is independent of this ratio, whereas under monopsony
the distortion becomes small as the high types from whom it seeks to extract rents become more
scarce: as qH=qL tends to zero, (44) shows that ymL tends to y
 and y   ymL is of order (qH=qL) :
Therefore w(y)  w (ymL ) is of order (qH=qL)2 ; implying that Lm << Lc:
Proposition 11 There exist qH such that for all qH  qH ; welfare is higher under monopsony
than under competition.
 Quadratic cost. From here on, we focus on the specication
C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab; with  > 0; (48)
as it allows for many further results, particularly on comparative statics.30 E¤ort levels are thus
a(y) =
 
yA   yB =  1  2 and b(y) =  yB   yA =  1  2 ; non-negative as long as yA=yB 2
[; 1=] : The key properties of rst-best incentives parallel those in Holmström and Milgrom (1991):
Proposition 12 The rst-best incentive yA is decreasing in B and 2A; and increasing in A and
2B; whereas y
B has the opposite properties. Both are decreasing in risk aversion, r:
Turning now to monopsony and competition, the system (A.17)-(A.18) can also be rewritten in
terms of the price distortions y   y;  = A;B; leading to the following set of results.
Proposition 13 (incentive distortions) The relative overincentivization of task B compared to
task A induced by competition is equal to the relative underincentivization of task B compared to
task A induced by monopsony:
yB;cH   yB
yA;cH   yA
=
yB   yB;mL
yA   yA;mL
=

1 + r
 
1  22AB + A
1 + r (1  2)2B

A + B
   2A; 2B;A=B; r : (49)
It is greater:
(i) The greater the noise 2A in task A and the lower the noise 
2
B in task B;
(ii) The greater the comparative advantage B=A of H types in task B; relative to task A;
(iii) The greater workersrisk aversion if 2A=
2
B > 
A=B (and the smaller if not).
30 It also makes Proposition (11) an  if and only ifstatement; details are available upon request.
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These results are intuitive: more noisy measurement makes a task a less e¢ cient screening de-
vice whether for rent-extraction or employee-selection purposeswhile a higher ability di¤erential
of low and high types makes it a more e¢ cient one. As to the mirror imageproperty of relative
price wedges under monopsony and competition, it reects the fact that both types of rms equalize
the (normalized) marginal distortions across tasks. We next consider workerse¤ort allocations.
Proposition 14 (e¤ort distortions) (1) Competition distorts high-skill agentse¤ort ratio away
from task A; and monopsony away from task B; a(ycH)=b(y
c
H) < a(y
)=b(y) < a(ymL )=b(y
m
L ); if and
only if
A  B
B   A >
A
B
: (50)
(2) Competition reduces the absolute level of e¤ort on task A, a(ycH) < a(y
); while increasing
that on task B (and monopsony has the opposite e¤ects), if and only if
r2A
1 + r2B
>
A
B
: (51)
The message of Proposition 14 accords with that of Sections 3.1-3.2, but it also yields several
new insights about how the misallocation of e¤orts is shaped by the measurement error in each
the two tasks, their substitutability in e¤ort, high-skill agentscomparative advantage in one or the
other, and the degree of risk aversion. The second result is particularly noteworthy: even though
both tasks are more strongly incentivized under competition, e¤ort in task A still declines, because
task B becomes disproportionately rewarded.31
 Technology and monitoring. In the last few decades, a number of technical and deregulatory
changes may have decreased A=B and increased A=B; making (51) more likely to hold and
magnifying the relative wedge in (49). Financial innovation and leverage, expensive high-tech med-
ical procedures, online tools allowing instant counts of researcherspublications and citations, all
arguably raise high-ability agents productivity advantage and its measurability more in individual,
revenue-generating tasks than in di¤use ones such as cooperation, public goods provision or avoid-
ing collective risks. As to the increased monitoring of managers by more independent corporate
boards (Hermalin 2005) and of rmsperformance by the nancial media, its impact hinges on
whether they focus more on earnings, costs and market share or on long-term safety, environmental
and legal liabilities.
7 Competition for the Motivated
We now return to the benchmark specication of Section 3 (task A is non-contractible, task B
is perfectly measurable, agents are risk-neutral) and study the polar case where all workers have
the same productivity  (normalized to 0 without loss of generality) in task B but di¤er in their
ethicalmotivations v for task A : a fraction qL has v = vL and the remaining qH have v = vH :
31Note also that when (A.20) holds, so that a(y)  0; b(y)  0; (51) implies (50).
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When an agent of type vi is employed under a compensation scheme (y; z); his net utility is
ui(y) + z and his employers prot i(y)  z; where
ui(y)  max
(a;b)
fvia+ yb  C(a; b)g; (52)
i(y)  Aai(y) + (B   y)bi(y): (53)
Let ai(y) and bi(y) denote the optimal e¤orts, solving the system fCa(a; b) = vi and Cb(a; b) = yg;
note that u0i(y) = b: Concavity of the cost function implies here again that a
0
i(y) < 0 < b
0
i(y); as
well as aL(y) < aH(y) and bH(y) < bL(y) in response to any given incentive rate y > 0:
In contrast to the case of heterogeneity in talent ; there are now generally di¤erent optimal
incentive rates for each type of worker, which we denote as32
yi  argmaxfwi(y)  ui(y) + i(y)g: (54)
Note next that, when confronted with an incentive-compatible menu of options, the more pro-
social type (vH) chooses a less powerful incentive scheme: yH  yL and zH  zL:33 This, in turn,
implies that if aL and aH are the two typesequilibrium e¤orts on task A, then aL  aH : The more
pro-socially inclined employee exerts more e¤ort on A both because he is more motivated for it and
because he selects a lower-powered incentive scheme.
 Monopsony. The monopsonist o¤ers an incentive-compatible menu (yL; zL) and (yH ; zH); or
equivalently (yL; UL) and (yH ; UH) so as to solve:
max
f(yi; zi)gi=H;L
f P
i=H;L
qi [wi(yi)  Ui] g; subject to
UL  U
UH  UL + uH(yL)  uL(yL)
UL  UH + uL(yH)  uH(yH):
The rst two constraints must clearly be binding, while the third imposes yH  yL; as seen above.
Substituting in, the solution satises ymH = y

H and, when interior,
w0L(yL) =
qH
qL

u0H(yL)  u0L(yL)

=
qH
qL
[bH(y)  bL(y)] : (55)
More generally, the left-hand side of (55) must be no greater than the right-hand side. Since the
latter is strictly negative, one must have ymL > y

L in any case: the monopsonist o¤ers a higher-
powered incentive scheme than under symmetric information so as to limit the rent of the more
prosocial types, who clearly benets less from an increase in y:
 Perfect competition. Because employeesintrinsic-motivation benets va are private, rms have
32 In the quadratic-cost benchmark, however, yL = y

H = B   A: In general, the variation of y with v involves the
third derivatives of C and is thus ambiguous.
33Adding up the two incentive constraints, UH  UL + uH(yL)  uL(yL) and UL  UH   uH(yH) + uL(yH); yields
0  R yL
yH
[u0H(y)  u0L(y)] dy =
R yL
yH
[bH(y)  bL(y)] dy: Since bH(y) < bL(y) for all y; the result follows.
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no reason to compete to select more prosocial types. As a result, the kind of escalating incentive
distortion seen earlier does not arise, and the competitive equilibrium is the symmetric-information
outcome. Employers o¤er the menu f(yi ; zi )gi=H;L; where for each type yi is the e¢ cient incentive
rate dened by (54) and zi  i(yi ); leaving the rm with zero prot. Type i = H;L then selects
max
j2fH;Lg

ui(y

j ) + i(y

j ) = wi(y

j )
	
: (56)
By (54), choosing j = i is optimal, so the symmetric-information outcome is incentive compatible.
Proposition 15 When agents are similar in measurable talent  but di¤er in their ethical values
v; monopsony leads to an overincentivization of low-motivation types, ymL > y

L (with y
m
H = y

H),
whereas competition leads to the rst-best outcome, ycL = y

L; y
c
H = y

H :
Would conclusions di¤er under an alternative specication of the impact of prosocial hetero-
geneity? Suppose that instead of enjoying task A more, a more prosocial agent supplies more
unmeasured positive externalities on the rm (or on her coworkers, so that their productivity is
higher, or their wages can be reduced due to a better work environment). In other words, agents
i = H;L share the same preferences but have di¤erent productivities in the A activity:
u(y) = max
(a;b)
fva+ yb  C(a; b)g; (57)
i(y) = A (a(y) + i) + (B   y)b(y): (58)
Under this formulation there is no way to screen an agents type, so the outcome under both
monopsony and competition is full pooling at the e¢ cient incentive power:
yi = y
  argmaxfAa(y) +Bb(y)  C (a(y); b(y))g: (59)
Sorting will occur, on the other hand, when agentsintrinsic motivation is not unconditional, as we
have assumed, but reciprocal that is, dependent on the presence in the same rm of other people
who act cooperatively (e.g., Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011)), or on the rm fullling a socially
valuable mission rather than merely maximizing prots (e.g., Besley and Ghatak 2005, 2006, Brekke
and Nyborg 2006). The fact that the benets of competing for the motivated are somewhat
attenuated in our model only reinforces the contrast with the potentially very distortionary e¤ects
of competition for talent, thus further strengthening our main message.
8 Related Theories
 Adverse selection. Our paper relates to and extends several lines of work. The rst one is that
on screening with exclusive contracts, initiated by Rothschild and Stiglitzs (1976) seminal study
of a perfectly competitive (free entry) insurance market. Croker and Snow (1985) characterize the
Pareto frontier in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model and show how it ranges from suboptimal insur-
ance for the safer type (as in the original separating equilibrium) to over-insurance for the risky
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type. Stewart (1994) and Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) study perfectly competitive insurance
markets with adverse selection and moral hazard: agents can exert risk-reducing e¤orts, at some
privately known cost. In equilibrium the better agents choose contracts with higher deductibles, for
which they substitute higher precautionary e¤ort.34 Moen and Rosen (2005) consider a perfectly
competitive labor market with adverse selection about workerse¤ort cost function. True output
is mismeasured by the employer and subject to a productivity shock, which agents learn prior to
choosing e¤ort. Focusing on a¢ ne contracts leads to a separating equilibrium in which high types
are overincentivized relative to the social optimum, and thus bear too much risk; progressive taxes
can remedy this distortion.35
Our paper extends the literature by analyzing screening in a multitask environment and by
deriving equilibrium and welfare for the whole range of competition intensities between the polar
cases of monopsony and perfect competition, which most previous work has focused on comparing
to the rst-best. A notable exception to the latter point is Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999),
who study Hotelling competition between banks that screen credit risks through costly collateral
requirements. As product di¤erentiation declines, lenders compete more aggressively for the most
protable borrowers, and the resulting increase in screening costs (collateral posted) can be such
that overall welfare falls. Banksproblem is one of pure adverse selection, whereas in our context
there is also (multidimensional) moral hazard. We thus analyze how the structure of wage contracts,
e¤ort allocations, earnings and welfare vary with market frictions. We characterize the socially
optimal degree of competitiveness and derive predictions for changes in total pay inequality and its
performance-based component, which accord well with the empirical evidence.
Bannier et al. (2013) study competition for risk-averse employees with di¤erent abilities between
two vertically di¤erentiated single-task rms. A workers output is the product of his and the rms
productivities, his e¤ort and a random shock. In equilibrium, the low-productivity rm does not
employ anyone, but its o¤er denes workers reservation utilities. The degree of competition is
represented here by the relative productivity of the less e¢ cient rm; as in our case, its impact on
screening results in a hump-shaped prole for welfare. We focus on horizontal rm di¤erentiation
and our multitask model incorporates distortions to e¤ort allocation (short-termism, hidden risk,
etc.), which can arise even absent risk-sharing concerns. Besides hurting rms these may also
have important externalities on the rest of society, since what is hard to observe by employers is a
fortiori di¢ cult to monitor by regulators. We further analyze how competition a¤ects the level and
structure of earnings and derive a simple test of whether it lies in the benecial or harmful range.
In the latter case, we also study the regulation or taxation of bonuses and total pay.36
34Scheuer and Netzer (2010) contrast this e¢ ciency-promoting e¤ect of private insurance markets to a benevolent
government without commitment power, which would provide full insurance at the interim stage and thereby destroy
any ex-ante incentive for e¤ort. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) study price discrimination
in private-value models where principals do not directly care about agentstypes, but are solely concerned with rent
extraction. Vega and Weyl (2012) study product design when consumer heterogeneity is of high dimension relative
to rmschoice variables, which allows for both cream-skimming and rent-extraction to occur in equilibrium.
35Allowing nonlinear contracts leads to a weaker result, namely that the rst-best cannot be attained.
36Stantcheva (2014) studies optimal income taxation when perfectly competitive rms use work hours to screen
for workersproductivity. Welfare can then be higher when agentstypes are unknown to employers, as the need to
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 Multitasking. From the multitask literature we borrow and build on the idea that incentivizing
easily measurable tasks can jeopardize the provision of e¤ort on less measurable ones (e.g. Holm-
ström and Milgrom 1991, Itoh 1991, Baker at al. 1994, Dewatripont et al. 1999, Fehr and Schmidt
2004). Somewhat surprisingly, the impact of competition on the multitask problem has not at-
tracted much attention a fortiori not in combination with adverse selection.37 As in earlier work,
employers in our model choose (linear or nonlinear) compensation structures aiming to balance
incentives, but the desire to extract rents or the need to select the best employees now lead them to
o¤er socially distorted compensation schemes. In relatively competitive labor markets, in particu-
lar, a rm raising its performance-based pay exerts a negative externality: it fails to internalize the
fact that competitors, in order to retain their own talent, will also have to distort their incentive
structure and e¤ort allocation, thereby reducing the total surplus generated by their workforce.
Tymula (2012) studies a teamwork problem in which a workers output depends on both his own
selsh e¤ort and his partners helping e¤ort, each augmented by the respective agents productivity;
unlike here, there is no substitutability between e¤orts. Both individual and team output are
observable, and thus rewarded by employers, which compete under free entry by each o¤ering a
single linear contract. The equilibrium is separating and characterized by assortative matching,
which prevents low types from free-riding on high ones. To achieve separation, high types are
overincentivized on both tasks relative to the rst-best, so they work harder not only on their own
project but also on helping their teammate. By contrast, we predict underinvestment in the second
(less easily measurable) task at high enough levels of competition, even when it can be incentivized.
 Competition for talent. The idea that labor market pressure forces rms to alter the structure of
contracts they o¤er to managers is shared with a few other recent papers.38 In Marin and Verdier
(2009), international trade integration leads new entrants to compete with incumbents for manage-
rial talent. Unlike in our paper, agents receive no monetary incentives but derive private benets
from delegation, and those rents are non-monotonic with respect to competition. Furthermore,
equilibrium changes in organizational design and activities performed tend to be e¢ cient responses
to relative factor endowments. In Acharya et al. (2011), rms use two types of incentives: a reward
in case of success, and making it hard to resist a takeover with its ensuing loss of private benets
in case of failure (strong governance). Managers with (observable) high skills are in short supply,
so to attract them employers must renounce the threat of takeovers (weak governance), whereas
rms employing the more abundant low-skill types can still avail themselves of it. In contrast to our
signal talent counteracts the Mirrleesian incentive to underproduce. The contrast in results arises from rms and
the state being able to observe labor inputs, whereas in our context only output is observable (were it measurable in
Stantchevas single-task model, screening would yield the rst best).
37Acemoglu et al. (2007) show how career concerns can lead workers to engage in excessive signaling to prospective
employers, by exerting e¤ort on both a productive task and an unproductive one that makes performance appear
better than it really is. Firms could temper career incentives by organizing production according to teamwork, which
generates coarser public signals of individual abilities, but the required commitment to team-based compensation
fails to be credible when individual performance can still be observed inside the partnership.
38There is also an earlier literature examining the (generally ambiguous) e¤ects of product market competition
on managerial incentives and slack, whether through information revelation (Holmström 1982, Nalebu¤ and Stglitz
1983) or demand elasticities and the level of prots (Schmidt 1997, Raith 2003).
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model, competition thus weakens certain forms of incentives (dismissal for failure) while strength-
ening others (reward for success). Most importantly, rmsgovernance choices, and therefore also
the competitiveness of the labor market, have no allocative impact: they only redistribute a xed
surplus between managers, shareholders and raiders.39
More closely related are two recent papers showing how competition for talent in an adverse-
selection environment can lead to socially excessive incentives for (respectively) risk taking and
accounting manipulations. In Bijlsma et al. (2013), there are three tiers of actors: traders who
make unobservable choices of asset riskiness, banks protected by limited liability competing for
their services, and the public, which incurs losses in case of a negative outcome.40 This externality
on taxpayers creates a potential role for capital-adequacy regulation, but the paper shows that such
requirements can actually backre: when it is mediocre traders who generate the most downside
risk, banks will be induced to screen them out through bonus pay, thereby further increasing risk-
taking by top traders.41 In Marinovic and Povel (2014), risk-averse CEOs with unobservable talent
are paid a linear combination between a noisy measure of actual performance (e.g., rms value) and
a reported performance(e.g., earnings) which they can distort, at some private cost. The paper
compares the polar cases of monopsony and perfect competition and shows (as in our Section 6) that
the latter induces excess e¤ort and exacerbates misreporting. Competition for talent nonetheless
always improves rmsactual performance (all welfare losses are borne by the CEOs), whereas in
our model it can severely damage it.42
 Intrinsic motivation. A recent literature incorporates considerations of intrinsic motivation and
crowding out (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006) into compensation design and labor-market sorting.
Besley and Ghatak (2005, 2006) nd conditions under which agents who derive private benets
from working in mission-oriented sectors will match assortatively with such rms, where they
receive low pay but exert substantial e¤ort. Focusing on civil-service jobs, Prendergast (2007)
shows how it can be optimal to select employees who are either in empathy with their clients
(teachers, social workers, reghters) or somewhat hostile to them (police o¢ cers, tax or customs
inspectors). When the state has imperfect information about agents types, however, it is generally
not feasible to induce proper self-selection into jobs. Most closely related to our work in this
literature is the multitask model of Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011), in which workers di¤er in
39 In Thanassoulis (2013), competition also works by raising managerial rents (there is no ex-ante adverse selection,
hence no designing of contracts to attract or retain talent): the disutility of e¤ort increases through an income e¤ect,
requiring stronger incentives. If deferred compensation is more expensive to provide than short-term bonuses due to
managersimpatience, rms will use more of the latter, resulting in excessively myopic decisions.
40The paper, like ours, studies the impact of competition, albeit in a classical Hotelling model, so that monopoly
and duopoly are the objects of separate analyses (the latter restricted to transport costs small enough to ensure full
coverage). It does not consider implications for earnings inequality, nor possible distortions from regulating bonuses.
41Competition for talent also increases risk-taking in Acharya et al. (2012), but through a very di¤erent channel
interfering with the process of learning about agentsabilities.
42Garrett et al. (2014) study rmsscreening of consumers via non-linear price schedules. By allowing buyers to be
di¤erentially informed about rmso¤ers due to search or advertising frictions, their model also spans the full range
between monopoly and Bertrand competition. Buyers types are private values, however, so greater competition
always improves social welfare: rms are forced to shift down their entire quality-price schedules, and all consumer
types thus achieve higher utility.
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their social preferences rather than productivity: some are purely self-interested, others conditional
cooperators. Competition among employers leads to agents sorting themselves between selsh
jobs, which involve high bonuses but no cooperation among coworkers and thus attract only
selsh types, and cooperative jobscharacterized by muted incentives and cooperative behavior,
which are populated by conditional cooperators. Notably, positive prots emerge despite perfect
competition. Because the source of heterogeneity is di¤erent from the main one emphasized in our
paper, it is not surprising that the issue of excessive incentive pay does not arise in theirs.43
9 Conclusion
This paper has examined how the extent of labor market competition a¤ects the structure of
incentives, multitask e¤orts and outcomes such as short- and long-run prots, earnings inequality
and aggregate e¢ ciency. The analysis could be fruitfully extended in several directions.
First, one could analyze increased competition as a reduction in xed costs and examine whether
there is too little or too much entry: our full-spectrumvariant of Hotelling competition is equally
applicable to a circular market. More generally, it could prove useful in other settings, as it allows
for a clean separation between intra- and inter-market (or brand) competition and ensures that the
market remains covered at all levels of competitiveness between Bertrand and monopoly.
A second extension is to allow for asymmetries between rms or sectors. For instance, task
unobservability may be less of a concern for some (e.g., private-equity partnerships) and more for
others (large banks), but if they compete for talent the high-powered incentives e¢ ciently o¤ered in
the former may spread to the latter, and do damage there. Heterogeneity also raises the question of
the self-selection of agents into professions and their matching with rms or sectors, e.g., between
nance and science or engineering.
Our analysis has focused on increased competition in the labor market, but similar e¤ects could
arise from changes in the product market. One can thus envision settings in which high-skill workers
become more valuable as rms compete harder for customers, for instance because the latter become
more sensitive to quality. Finally, the upward pressure exerted on pay by competition could also
result in agents motivated primarily by monetary gain displacing intrinsically motivated ones within
(some) rms, potentially resulting in a di¤erent but equally detrimental form of bonus culture.
43 Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) study the interplay of instrinsic motivation with common agency. Informed inter-
mediaries value providing customers with honest advice about their needs (the equivalent of activity A in our model),
but also receive commissions from producers for pushingtheir goods. Manufacturer competition is intense (fees are
high and prots low, though recommendations not necessarily more distorted) when agentsintrinsic or reputational
motivation is low. The source of welfare losses is here the common-agency problem, rather than screening.
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Appendix A: Quadratic-Cost Case
Let the cost function be
C(a; b) = a2=2 + b2=2 + ab: (A.1)
with 2 < 1; ensuring convexity. The main case of interest is  > 0 (e¤orts are substitutes), but
all derivations and formulas hold with  < 0 (complements) as well. The rst-order conditions for
maximizing (1) yield v = a+ b; and y = b+ a; hence
a(y) =
v   y
1  2 ; b(y) =
y   v
1  2 ; and a
0(y) =
 
1  2 ; b
0(y) =
1
1  2 : (A.2)
Equations (9)-(10) then lead to
y = B   A; (A.3)
w(y)  w(y) =  
Z y
y
w0(z) dz =  
Z y
y

y   z
1  2

dz =
(y   y)2
2 (1  2) : (A.4)
1. Monopsony. Substituting the last two expressions into Proposition 1 yields
ymL = y
   (1  2)qH
qL
; (A.5)
Lm =
1
2
q2H
qL
(1  2)()2: (A.6)
2. Perfect competition. From (A.4) and (20), we get:
1
2 (1  2)(y
c
H   y)2 = (B   ycH): (A.7)
Let   ycH   y = ycH  B+ A > 0 and ! 
 
1  2: Then Q()  2+2! (   A) = 0 and
solving this polynomial yields  =  ! +
p
!2 + 2!A > 0; or
ycH = B   A  ! +
p
!2 + 2!A: (A.8)
Note that ycH < B; since ! + A >
p
!2 + 2!A: Using (20), the resulting e¢ ciency loss relative
to the social optimum is
Lc = qH [w(y
)  w(ycH)] = (B   ycH) qH =

A+ !  
p
!2 + 2!A

qH: (A.9)
Finally, the least-cost separating allocation is interim e¢ cient if (21) holds, which here becomes
1
1  qL 
r
1 +
2A
!
; or equivalently (A.10)
A
!
 1
2

qL
qH
2
+
qL
qH
: (A.11)
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3. Welfare under monopsony versus competition. Using (A.6) and (A.9), condition (24) becomes:
q2H
2qL
 
1  2 ()2 < (B   ycH)qH () qH2qL! < A   ()  < A  qH2qL!:
Substituting into the polynomial equation Q()  0; this is equivalent to:
A  qH
2qL
!
2
> 2!

qH
2qL
!

=
qH
qL
!2;
which yields (25). This inequality and the interim e¢ ciency condition (A.11) are simultaneously
satised if and only if
M(qL)  1  qL
2qL
+
r
1  qL
qL
<

1  2
A

 1
2

qL
1  qL
2
+
qL
1  qL 
M(qL): (A.12)
Note that:
(i) M(qL) < M(qL) if and only if qH=qL < 1; so for any qL > 1=2; (A.12) denes a nonempty
range for (A=)

=(1  2) :
(ii) As qL ! 1; M(qL) ! 0 and M(qL) ! +1; so arbitrary values of (A=)

=(1  2)
become feasible, including arbitrarily large values of A or arbitrarily low values of : In particular,
imposing A < B(1 2) qH=qL to ensure 0 < y < ymL is never a problem for qL large enough.
4. Imperfect competition. In Region I, y^H(t) is dened as the solution to (B.23) in Appendix
B, which here becomes:
(yH   y)2
2(1  2)   (B   yH) +
t
qL
(yH   y)
(1  2) = 0 ()
2 + 2 (t=qL)    2!(A  ) = 2 + 2(! + t=qL)   2!A = 0;
with the above denitions of ! and  = yH   y: Solving, we have:
y^H(t) = B   A  t=qL   ! +
p
(! + t=qL)2 + 2!A: (A.13)
It is easily veried that y^H(0) = ycH and
qL  y^0H(t) =  1 +
! + t=qLp
(! + t=qL)2 + 2!A
< 0: (A.14)
Moreover, this expression is increasing in t; so y^H(t) is decreasing and convex over Region I.
In Region II, y^H(t) is dened as the solution to (B.26) in Appendix B, which here becomes:
w(y) + LB   (yH   y
)2
2(1  2) + (B   yH)  
t

(yH   y)
(1  2)  
U   t = 0 ()
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2
2(1  2) + (   A) +
t


(1  2)   LB +
U + t  w(y) = 0 ()
2 + 2(   A)! + 2t

+ 2(1  2)   U + t  LB   w(y) = 0 ()
2 + 2(! + t=)  2A!   2(1  2)  w(y) + LB   U   t = 0:
Solving, we have:
y^H(t) = B   A  t= !+
q
(! + t=)2 + 2[!A+ (1  2)  w(y) + LB   U   t]; (A.15)
noting that the expression under the square root can also be written as !2 + (t=)2 + 2[!A +
(1  2)  w(y) + LB   U] > 0: Moreover,
y^0H(t)() =  1 +
1q
1 + 2[!A+ (1  2)  w(y) + LB   U   t =(! + t=)2] < 0
and it is increasing in t; so y^H(t) is decreasing and convex over Region II.
In Region III, y^L(t) is dened as the solution to (B.30). Denoting  = yL y; this now becomes:
w(y) + LB   U   t+ (A  )   tqL
qH

(1  2) = 0 ()
(1  2) w(y) + LB   U   t+ A =  ! + tqL
qH

:
Solving, we have:
y^L(t) = B   A 
(1  2)  U + t  w(y)  LB  !A
! + tqL=qH
: (A.16)
It is easily veried that limt!+1 y^L(t) = B   A  (1  2)qH=qL = ymL : Moreover, by (11),
y^0L(t)() =
(qL=qH)

U   w(y)  LB   A
  !
(! + tqL=qH)
2 =(1  2) < 0
and this function is increasing in t; implying that y^L(t) is convex. 
Welfare e¤ects of transport costs (claim following Proposition 5). Let W (t) =
w(y^H(t)) + qLw(y^L(t)) + B and ~W (t)  W (t)   t=4: By Proposition 5, W 0(t) > 0 for all
t < t2: We now nd conditions ensuring that ~W 0(t) > 0 for t small enough. For t  t1;W 0(t) =
qHw
0(y^H(t))y^0H(t): With quadratic costs, and using (A.4), (A.8) and (A.14), qHw
0(ycH)y^
0
H(0) =
(qH=qL)
p
1 + 2A=!   1

1  1=p1 + 2A=! ; which for small  is equivalent to (qH=qL)p
2A=!: As seen from (A.10), interim e¢ ciency requires qH  (1 + 2A=!) 1=2 
p
!=2A:
Letting qH /
p
!=2A yields qHW 0(0)y^0H(0)  1=qL > 1=4; hence the result. 
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Proof of Propositions 12 and 13. The rst-order conditions of the rst-best, monopsony and
competitive problems lead to very similar systems of linear equations,
A  B   yAi + yBi   r
 
1  22AyAi =  ~  1  2A; (A.17)
B   A  yBi + yAi   r
 
1  22ByBi =  ~  1  2B; (A.18)
with the only di¤erence being that (yi = y; ~ = 0) in the rst case, (yi = ymL ; ~ = qH=qL) in the
second, and (yi = ycH ; ~ = 
c) in the third. For the rst-best, setting ~ = 0 yields
yA =
r2B (A  B) +A
1 + r
 
2A + 
2
B

+ (1  2)r22A2B
< A; (A.19)
and a similar formula for yB < B; obtained by permuting the roles of A and B: The condition
  yA=yB  1=, which ensures that a(y)  0 and b(y)  0; is then equivalent to44
r2A
1 + r2B
 A  B
B   A 
1 + r2A
r2B
: (A.20)
Next, subtracting the rst-best solution from (A.17)-(A.18) and denoting x  y   y,  =
A;B; yields
  [1 + r  1  22A]xA + xB =  ~  1  2A; (A.21)
xA   [1 + r  1  22B]xB =  ~  1  2B; (A.22)
from which  = xB;cH =x
A;c
H = x
B;m
L =x
A;m
L is easily obtained. Its comparative statics follow from
direct computation. 
Proof of Proposition 14. (1) It easily seen that a(ycH)=b(y
c
H) < a(y
)=b(y) < a(ymL )=b(y
m
L ) if
and only if yB=yA < xB;cH =x
A;c
H = x
B;m
L =x
A;m
L = : Using (A.19) and (49), this means:
1 + r
 
1  22BA + B
1 + r (1  2)2A

B + A
<
r2B (A  B) +A
r2A (B   A) +B
:
This can be rewritten as
A
B
<

1 + r
 
1  22A r2B (A  B) +A   r2A (B   A) +B
1 + r (1  2)2B
 
r2A (B   A) +B
   r2B (A  B) +A
=

1 + r
 
1  22A r2B (A  B) +A  B + r2A [A  B]
1 + r (1  2)2B

r2A (B   A) +B   A+ r2B (B   A)
;
44An alternative way of ensuring that a remains non-negative (allowing 2A to become arbitrary large) is of course to
incorporate intrinsic motivation vaa into (40), with va  B: The model then nests that of Section 2 as a limiting case
for (2A; 
2
B) ! (+1; 0): Alternatively, a < 0 (say) may be interpreted as nefarious or antisocial activities (stealing
coworkersideas, devising schemes to deceive customers, et.) that require e¤ort but allow the agent to increase his
performance and bonus earnedin the B dimension.
39
which simplies to (50).
(2) We have a(ycH) < a(y
) < a(ymL ) if and only if x
A;c
H < x
B;c
H and x
A;m
L > x
B;m
L ; which given
that x;cH > 0 > x
;m
L for  = A;B; means that  > 1: This occurs when


1 + r
 
1  22AB + 2A > 1 + r  1  22BA + B ()
r
 
1  2 2AB   2BA > (1  )2A () r 2AB   2BA > A;
which yields (51). Furthermore, b(ycH) > b(y
) if only if xBH > x
A
H ; i.e.  > ; which is implied by
 > 1: Note, on the other hand, that competition always increases total gross output above the
e¢ cient level, Aa(y)+Bb(y) < Aa(ycH)+Bb(y
c
H); if only if 0 < A
 
xAH   xBH

+B
 
xBH   xAH

; or
equivalently (since xAH > 0) 0 < A (1  )+B (  ) = A B+(B A); which always holds.
For a monopsonist xAL < 0; so the same condition yields Aa(y
m
L ) +Bb(y
m
L ) < Aa(y
) +Bb(y): 
Appendix B: Main Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Only the comparative-statics results remains to prove. First, di¤eren-
tiating (13) and (15) with respect to  yields
@ymL
@
=
qH
qL
1
wyy(ymL )
< 0 < qH
wy(y
m
L )
 wyy(ymL )
=
@Lm
@
: (B.1)
Turning next to A and using (9); we have
@ymL
@A
=
wyA(y
m
L )
 wyy(ymL )
=
a0(ymL )
 wyy(ymL )
< 0 (B.2)
1
qL
@Lm
@A
= wA(y
;A;B)  wA(ymL ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@A
  wy(ymL ;A;B)
@ymL
@A
= a(y)  a(ymL ) 
qH
qL

@ymL
@A
; (B.3)
showing clearly the two opposing e¤ects discussed in the text, and which exactly cancel out in the
quadratic-cost case (see (A.5)). Similarly, for B :
@ymL
@B
=
wyB(y
m
L )
 wyy(ymL )
=
b0(ymL )
 wyy(ymL )
> 0 (B.4)
1
qL
@Lm
@B
= wB(y
;A;B)  wB(ymL ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@B
  wy(ymL ;A;B)
@ymL
@B
= b(y)  b(ymL ) 
qH
qL

@ymL
@B
:  (B.5)
Proof of Lemma 1. Denote U cL and U
c
H the two typesutilities in the LCS allocation, and recall
that the former takes the same value as under symmetric information.
Claim 1 The LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient if and only if it solves the following program:
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(P) : max
(UL;UH ;yH ;yL)
fUHg; subject to:
UL  U cL = w(y) + LB (B.6)
UL  UH   yH (B.7)
UH  UL + yL (B.8)
0  P
i=H;L
qi [w(yi) +Bi   Ui] ; (B.9)
Proof. Conditions (B.7) and (B.8) are the incentive constraints for types L and H respectively,
and condition (B.9) the employersinterim break-even constraint. Now, note that:
(i) If the LCS allocation does not achieve the optimum, interim e¢ ciency clearly fails.
(ii) If the LCS allocation solves (P); there can clearly be no incentive-compatible Pareto im-
provement in which UH > U cH ; but neither can there be one in which UH = U
c
H and UL > U
c
L:
Otherwise, note rst that one could without loss of generality take such an allocation, to satisfy
yH  y; otherwise, replacing yH by y while keeping UH and UL unchanged strictly increases
prots, so the LCS allocation remains (even more) dominated. Starting from such an allocation
with yH  y; let us now reduce UL by some small  > 0 and increase UH by some small ", while
also increasing yH by ("+ ) = to leave (B.6) unchanged (while (B.7) is only strengthened). This
results in extra prots of qH [w0(yH) ("+ )   "] + qL; which is positive as long as
 >
qH [1  w0(yH)] "
qL + qHw0(yH)
:
Both types and the rm are now strictly better o¤ than in the LCS allocation, contradicting the
fact that it is a solution to (P):
To study interim e¢ ciency and prove Lemma 1, let us therefore analyze the solution(s) to (P):
First, condition (B.9) must be binding, otherwise UL and UH could be increased by the same small
amount without violating the other constraints. Second, (B.7) must also be binding, otherwise
solving (P) without that constraint and with (B.9) as an equality leads to yL = y = yH ; UL = U cL
and UH = w(y) + BH ; thus UH   UL = B; violating (B.7). Third, (B.8) now reduces to
yH  yL: Two cases can then arise:
(i) If (B.6) is binding, the triple (UL, UH , yH) is uniquely given by the same three equality
constraints as the LCS allocation, and thus coincides with it.
(ii) If (B.6) is not binding, the solution to (P) is the same as when that constraint is dropped.
Substituting (B.7) into (B.9), and both being equalities, we have UH = qi [w(yi) +Bi]+qLyH;
so (P) reduces to
max
yH ;yL
fqH [w(yH) + (qL=qH) yH ] + qLw(yL) jyH  yLg: (B.10)
For all x  0; dene the function ~y(x)  argmaxyfw(y)+xy g and let x   w0(B). On the interval
[0; x] the function ~y is given by w0(~y(x)) =  x; so it is strictly increasing up to ~y(x) = B; while
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for x > x; ~y(x)  B: Furthermore, it is clear that ~y(x)  y with equality only at x = 0; so the
pair (yH = ~y(qL=qH); yL = y) is the solution to (B.10). It is then indeed the case that (B.6) is
non-binding, U cL = w(y
) +BL < UH   yH = UL; if and only if
w(y) +BL < qH [w(yH) +BH ] + qL [w(y) +BL]  qHyH;
with yH = ~y(qL=qH): Equivalently, H(qL=qH) > 0; where
H(x)  w(~y(x))  w(y) + [B   ~y(x)]: (B.11)
Note thatH(0) > 0 andH(x) < 0 for x  x; while on [0; x] we haveH 0(x) = [w0(~y(x)) ] ~y0(x) =
(qL=qH   1)~y0(x) =  (=qH)~y0(x): Therefore, there exists a unique ~x 2 (0; x) such that (B.6) is
non-binding and the solution to (P) thus di¤ers from the LCS allocationif and only ifqL=qH <
~x: Equivalently, the LCS allocation is the unique solution to (P); and therefore interim e¢ cient, if
and only if qL=(1 qL)  ~x=  ~qL=(1 ~qL); hence the result. For small it is easily veried from
H(~x)  0 and w0(~y(x)) =  x (implying ~y0(x) =  1=w00(~y(x))) that  ~x2=w00(y)  2 (B   y);
so that ~qL  1  
p
; where 1= p 2w"(y) (y  B): 
Proof of Proposition 2. To complete the proof of Results (1) and (2), it just remains to show
that: (a) If the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient, it is a competitive equilibrium; (b) It is then the
unique one. We shall also prove here that: (c) If the LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient, there
exists no competitive equilibrium in pure strategies.
Claim 2 In any competitive equilibrium, the utilities (UL; UH) must satisfy
UL  U cL = USIL  w(y) + LB; (B.12)
UH  U cH  w(ycH) + HB; (B.13)
Proof. If UL < U cL; a rm could o¤er the single contract (y = y
; z = zcL   ") for " small,
attracting and making a prot " on type L (perhaps also attracting the more protable type H).
Similarly, if UH < U cH ; it could o¤er the incentive-compatible menu f(y; zcL   "); (ycH ; zcH   ")g
thereby attracting and making a prot " on type H (perhaps also attracting and making zero
prot on type L).
Claim 3 If an allocation Pareto dominates (in the interim-e¢ ciency sense) the least-cost separat-
ing one, it must involve a cross-subsidy from high to low types, meaning that
w(yH) +BH   UH > 0 > w(yL) +BL   UL; (B.14)
Proof. If UL  w(yL)+LB; then UL  U cL requires that yL = y and UL = w(yL)+LB = U cL:
Incentive-compatibility and Pareto-dominance then imply that UL + yH  UH > U cH = UL +
ycH; hence yH > y
c
H : This, in turn, leads to w(yH) + HB   UH < w(ycH) + HB   UH =
U cH  UH < 0; violating the break-even condition. Therefore, it must be that w(yL) +BL  UL <
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0; meaning that low types get more than the total surplus they generate. For the employer to break
even, it must be that high types get strictly less, w(yH) +BH   UH > 0:
We are now ready to establish the properties (a)-(c) listed above, and thereby complete the
proof of Results (1) and (2) in Proposition 2.
(a) Suppose that the LCS allocation, dened by (16)-(20), is o¤ered by all rms. Could another
one come in and o¤er a di¤erent set of contracts, leading to new utilities (UL; UH) and a strictly
positive prot? First, note that we can without loss of generality assume that UL  U cL : if
UL < U
c
L and UH is indeed selected (with positive probability) by type H, then (U
c
L , UH) is
incentive-compatible. By o¤ering U cL to L types (via their symmetric-information allocation), the
deviating rm does not alter its protability. Second, if UH < U cH , the deviating employer does
not attract type H; since it cannot make money on type L while providing UL  U cL, the deviation
is not protable. Finally, suppose that UL  U cL and UH  U cH . If at least one inequality is strict,
then interim e¢ ciency of the LCS allocation implies that the deviating rm loses money. If both
are equalities, let us specify (for instance) that both types workers, being indi¤erent, do not select
the deviating rm.
(b) By (B.12)-(B.13), in any equilibrium both types must be no worse o¤ than in the LCS allo-
cation, and similarly for the rm, which must make non-negative prots. If any of these inequalities
is strict there is Pareto dominance, so when the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient, they must all
be equalities, giving the LCS allocation as the unique solution.
(c) Suppose now that LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient. The contract that solves (P)
is then such that yH = ~y(x); yL = y; UL > U cL (equation (B.6) is not binding) and UH > U
c
H
(since the LCS does not solve (P)): A rm can then o¤er a contract with the same yH and yL
but reducing both UH and UL by the same small amount, resulting in positive prots; the LCS
allocation is thus not an equilibrium. Suppose now that some other allocation, with utilities UL
and UH , is an equilibrium. As seen in (b), it would have to Pareto-dominate the LCS allocation,
which by Claim 3 implies:
UL  UH   yH;
w(yH) +BH   UH > 0:
Consider now a deviating employer o¤ering a single contract, aimed at the high type: y0H = yH + "
and U 0H = UH + (")=2 < w(y
0
H) + BH : The low type does not take it up, as it would yield
U 0L = UL   (")=2: The high type clearly does, leading to a positive prot for the deviator.k
The only part of Proposition 2 remaining to prove are the comparative static results. Di¤eren-
tiating (20) and (22) with respect to  yields
@ycH
@
=
B   ycH
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
> 0;
@Lc
@
=  qHwy(ymH ;A;B)
@ycH
@
> 0: (B.15)
Turning next to A;
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 @y
c
H
@A
= wA(y
;A;B)  wA(ycH ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@A
  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@A
= a(y)  a(ycH)  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@A
)
@ycH
@A
=
a(ycH)  a(y)
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
< 0 <  qH@y
c
H
@A
=
@Lc
@A
: (B.16)
Again there is a direct and an indirect e¤ect of A on Lc, but now the direct one always dominates.
For B; in contrast, the ambiguity remains:
  @y
c
H
@B
= wB(y
;A;B)  wB(ycH ;A;B) + wy(y;A;B)
@y
@B
  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@B
= b(y)  b(ycH)  wy(ycH ;A;B)
@ycH
@B
) (B.17)
@ycH
@B
=
 + b(ycH)  b(y)
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
> 0; (B.18)
1
qH
@Lc
@B
= 1  @y
c
H
@B
=
 wy(ycH ;A;B)  b(ycH) + b(y)
   wy(ycH ;A;B)
: (B.19)
In the quadratic case, Lc is independent of B and the last term thus equal to zero; see (A.9). 
Proof of Proposition 4. We solve for the symmetric equilibrium under the assumption that
market shares are always interior, and thus given by (29). In Appendix D we verify that individual
deviations to corner solutions (one rm grabbing the whole market for some worker type, or on the
contrary dropping them altogether) can indeed be excluded.
To characterize the symmetric solution to (30)-(33), we distinguish three regions.
Region I. Suppose rst that the low types individual rationality constraint is not binding,
UL > U; so that  = 0:
Lemma 3 If  = 0; then H = 0  L and yL = y  yH:
Proof. (i) If H = L = 0; then yH = yL = y by (36)-(37), so (31)-(32) imply that UH UL =
y: Next, from (34)-(35) we have H L = t L = 0; whereas H L  B  (UH UL) =
(B   y) > 0; a contradiction.
(ii) If H > 0 = L condition (37) implies w
0(yL) > 0; hence yL < y, and condition (36)
yH = y
: Moreover, (34)-(35) and H > L require that H < t < L. However,
H   L = w(y)  w(yL) + (B   yL) > 0;
a contradiction. We are thus left with H = 0 < L; which implies yL = y
 < yH by (36)-(37).
Let us now derive and characterize yH as a function of t: We can rewrite (36) as
tqHw
0(yH) =  L =  qL(L   t): (B.20)
Summing (34)-(35) and recalling that i  w(yi) + iB   Ui yields
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UL + t = qH [w(yH) + HB   (UH   UL)] + qL [w(y) + LB]
= qH [w(yH) + HB   yH] + qL [w(y) + LB] ; (B.21)
where the second equality reects the fact that (32) is an equality, since L > 0: Therefore:
L   t = w(y) + LB   UL   t
= w(y) + LB   qL [w(y) + LB]  qH [w(yH) + HB   yH]
= qH [w(y
)  w(yH)  (B   yH)] (B.22)
Substituting into (B.20) yields
(yH ; t)  w(yH)  w(y) + (B   yH) + tw
0(yH)
qL
= 0: (B.23)
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium value of yH over Region I, denoted y^IH(t):
Lemma 4 For any t  0 there exists a unique y^IH(t) 2 (y; B) to (B.23). It is strictly decreasing
in t; starting from the perfectly competitive value y^IH(0) = y
c
H :
Proof. The function (y; t) is strictly decreasing in y on [y; B); with (y) > 0 > (B);
hence existence and uniqueness. Strict monotonicity then follows from the fact that  is strictly
decreasing in t; while setting t = 0 in (B.23) shows that y^IH(0) must equal y
c
H ; dened in (20) as
the unique solution to w(y)   w(ycH) = (B   ycH): It only remains to verify that the solution
y^IH(t) is consistent with the initial assumption that  = 0; or equivalently UL > U: By (B.21), we
have for all yH
UL + t = qH [w(yH) + HB   yH] + qL [w(y) + LB]
= w(y) + LB + qH [(B   yH) + w(yH)  w(y)] : 
For yH = y^IH(t); the corresponding value of UL is strictly above U if and only if 	(t) > U + t;
where we dene for all t:
	(t)  w(y) + LB + qH
 
B   y^IH(t)

   w(y) + w(y^IH(t))

: (B.24)
Lemma 5 There exists a unique t1 > 0 such that 	(t)  U + t if and only if t  t1: On [0; t1]; the
low types utility UL is strictly decreasing in t; reaching U at t1:
Proof. At t = 0 the bracketed term is zero by denition of y^IH(0) = y
c
H ; so 	(0) = w(y
)+LB
> U by (14), which stated that a monopsonist hires both types, and limt!+1

	(t)  U   t =  1;
there exists at least one solution to 	(t) = U + t: To show that it is unique and the monotonicity
of UL; we establish that, 	0(t) < 1 for all t > 0: From (B.23) and (B.24), this means that
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qH

   w0(y^H)
  w0(y^H)=qL
   w0(y^H)  tw00(y^H)=qL

< 1 ()
qH

   w0(y^H)
   w0(y^H)=qL <    w0(y^H)  tw00(y^H)=qL ()
qH

   w0(y^H)
   w0(y^H) < qL    w0(y^H)  tw00(y^H) ()
tw
00
(y^H) <

   w0(y^H)
 
qHw
0(y^H) + qL

where we abbreviated y^IH(t) as y^H : In the last expression, the rst bracketed term is always non-
negative, whereas in the second one y < y^H < y^cH implies that qHw
0(y^H) + qL > qHw0(y^cH) +
qL > 0, by (21).
In summary, Region I consists of the interval [0; t1]; where t1 is uniquely dened by 	(t1) =
t1 + U: Over that interval, yL = y while yH = y^IH(t) is strictly decreasing in t; and therefore so
is the high types relative rent, UH   UL = y^IH(t): The low types utility level UL need not be
declining, but its starts at a positive value and reaches U exactly at t1:
For t  t1; the constraint UL  U is binding. Recalling that HL must always equal zero,
we distinguish two subregions, depending on whether H = 0 (Region II) or L = 0 (Region III),
and show that these are two intervals, respectively [t1; t2] and [t2;+1), with t1 < t2: Thus, inside
Region II the low types incentive constraint is binding but not the high types (L > 0 = H for
t 2 (t1; t2)); whereas inside Region 2 it is the reverse (H > 0 = L for t > t2):
Region II. Consider rst the values of t where H = 0 < L: As before, this implies that
yL = y
 < yH and UH   UL = yH; or UH = U + yH since UL = U: Therefore:
L = qH(H   t) = qH [w(yH) + HB   UH   t] = qH

w(yH) + HB   yH   U   t

: (B.25)
Substituting into condition (36), the latter becomes
 (yH ; t)  w(yH) + HB   yH   U   t+ tw
0(yH)

= 0: (B.26)
On the interval [y; B); the function  (y; t) is strictly decreasing in yH and t; with
 (y^IH(t); t)  w(y^H(t)) + HB   y^IH(t) +
tw0(y^IH(t))

  U   t
= w(y) + LB +

1  1
qL

tw0(yIH(t1))

  U   t
= w(y) +BL   t

1 +
qH
qL
w0(yH)


  U: (B.27)
At t = t1; substituting (B.23) into (B.24) yields  (y^IH(t1); t1) = 0: Furthermore, as t rises above t1;
y^IH(t) decreases, so w
0(y^IH(t)) increases. Since
qL + qHw
0(y^H(t)) > qL + qHw0(y^H(0)) = qL + qHw0(ycH) > 0
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by (21), t

qL + qHw
0(y^IH(t))

is also increasing in t; implying that  (y^IH(t); t) is decreasing in t
and therefore negative over (t1;+1): Next, observe that  (y; t) = w(y)+H(B y)+Ly  U t:
Dene therefore
t2  w(y) + H(B   y) + Ly   U; (B.28)
and note that
t1 = w(y
) + LB + qH
 
B   y^IH(t1)

   w(y) + w(y^IH(t1))
  U
< w(y) + LB + qH
 
B   y^IH(t1)

   U
< w(y) + LB + 1  (B   y)   U = t2:
Lemma 6 For all t 2 [t1; t2]; there exists a unique y^IIH (t) 2 [y; y^IH(t1))] such that  (y^IIH (t); t) = 0:
Furthermore, y^IIH (t) is strictly decreasing in t; starting at y^
II
H (t1) = y^(t1) and reaching y
 at t = t2:
For all t > t2;  (yH ; t) < 0 over all yH  y:
Proof. For t 2 [t1; t2] we have shown that  (y^H(t1); t)  0   (y; t); with the rst equality
strict except at t1 and the second one strict except at t2: Since  (y; t) is strictly decreasing in y
and t; the results follow. The fact that y^IIH (t) < y^
I
H(t) on (t1; t2] also means that if there is a kink
between the two curves at t1 it is a convex one, as shown in Figure III. And indeed, di¤erentiating
(B.23) and (B.26), we have    y^IH0 (t1) <    y^IIH 0 (t1) if and only if
   w
0
qL(   w0)  tw00 <
   w0
(   w0)  tw00 ) ()
 tw"
   w0 >  
 
qHw
0 + qL

:
with all derivatives evaluated at y^IH(t1) = y^
II
H (t1): Since y
 < y^IH(t1) < y
c
H the term on the left is
positive and that on the right negative.
As to t2; note that it is the only point where H = 0 = L (the only intersection of Regions II
and III). Indeed, this require yH = y = yL by (36)-(37) and condition (37) together with UL = U
then implies that t = L = w(y) + LB   yL   U = t2:
Region II thus consists of the interval [t 1; t2]. Over that interval, yL = y while yH = y^IIH (t) is
strictly decreasing in t; and therefore so is the high types utility, UH = U + yH(t); while the
low types utility remains xed at UL = U:
Putting together Regions I and II, we shall dene:
y^H(t) =
(
y^IH(t) for t 2 [0; t1]
y^IIH (t) for t 2 [t1; t2]
: (B.29)
Region III. Inside this region, namely for t > t2; we have UL = U but now H > L = 0.
This implies that yH = y > yL by (36)-(37) and UH = U + yL by (31). Furthermore,
H = qH (t  H) = qH

t+ U + yL   w(y)  HB

Substituting into condition (37), the latter becomes
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(yL; t)  qH

w(y) + HB   yL   U   t

+
tqLw
0(yL)

= 0: (B.30)
On the interval [0; y]; the function (y; t) is strictly decreasing in yL; with
(y; t) = qH

w(y) + HB   y   U   t

= qH (t2   t) < 0:
Recall now that the monopsony price ymL is uniquely dened by w
0(ymL ) = (qH=qL): Therefore:
(ymL ; t) = qH

w(y) + LB   U + (B   ymL)

> 0:
Lemma 7 For all t  t2 there exists a unique y^L(t) such that (y^L(t); t) = 0; and ymL < y^L(t)  y;
with equality at t = t2: Furthermore, y^L(t) is strictly decreasing in t and limt!+1 y^L(t) = ymL :
Proof. Existence and uniqueness have been established. Next, @(y; t)=@t = qLw0(y)=   1:
At y = y^L(t); this equals 1=t times
 qH

w(y) + HB   yL   U   t
  t =  qLt  qH w(y) + HB   U   yL < 0;
so the function y^L(t) is strictly decreasing in t: Taking limits in (B.30) as t ! +1; nally, yields
as the unique solution limt!+1 y^L(t) = ymL :
Proof of Proposition 6. The fact that @UL=@t < 0 over Region I was shown in Lemma 5. To
show the last result, note that over Region III, we have
2 = qH [w(y
) + HB   y^L] + qL[w(y^L) + LB]  U )
1
qL
@
@y^L
= w0(y^L)  qH
qL
 > w0(y^mL ) 
qH
qL
 = 0;
so prots fall as t declines, as was shown to be the case over Regions I and II. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider rst total pay. Since zi = Ui   u(yi)   iyi; we can write
Yi = Ui + b(yi)yi   u(yi); for i = H;L: As t declines, Ui and yi increase (at least weakly) and
therefore so does Yi; since u0(y) = b: Furthermore,
YH   YL = UH   UL + b(yH)yH   u(yH) + u(yL)  b(yL)yL:
Over Regions I and II this becomes [ + b(yH)] yH u(yH) plus a constant term, with yH = y^H(t);
the result then follow from u0(y) = b: Over Region III, YH   YL = [   b(yL)] yL + u(yL) plus a
constant term, with yL = y^L(t); therefore, @(YH   YL)=@t < 0 if and only if b0(yL)yL < ; which
need not hold in general. With quadratic costs, b0(yL) = 1=(1  2) so it holds on [t2;+1) if and
only if y = B   A < (1  2): Turning now to performance-based pay, we have
@([b(yH) + H ] yH   [b(yL) + L] yL)
@t
=

b(yH) + H + yHb
0(yH)
 @yH
@t
 b(yL) + L + yLb0(yL) @yL
@t
:
In Regions I and II the rst term is negative and the second zero; in Region III it is the reverse.
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Turning nally to xed wages, zH   zL = UH  UL  HyH + LyL u(yH)+u(yL). In Regions
I and II, zH   zL =  L(yH   y)   u(yH) + u(y) is decreasing in yH ; hence increasing in t: In
Region III, zH   zL = (yL   y) H   u(y) + u(yL); so the opposite holds. 
Proof of Proposition 9. For any y 2 [0; ycH); let y  minfy; yg: A rm can always o¤er low
types their constrained symmetric-information allocation yL = y; L = 0 and w(y)+BL  USIL ;
so in equilibrium they must receive at least that much. Consider therefore the relaxed program
(from which high typesincentive-compatibility constraint has been omitted):
(Pr) : max
f(Ui;0yiy; 0i)gi=H;L
fUHg; subject to:
UL  USIL () (B.31)
UL  UH   yH   H (L) (B.32)
0  P
i=H;L
qi[w(yi) +Bi   (1  i)i   Ui]; () (B.33)
The rst-order conditions in UH and UL are respectively 1  L   qH = 0 and L +    qL = 0;
thus  = 1 +  > 0; (B.33) so that must bind, and L = qL(1 + )   : The rst-order conditions
in yH and H then take the form
(1 + )

qL + qHw
0(yH)
    0; with equality unless yH = y; (B.34)
(1 + ) [qL  qH(1  H)]    0; with equality unless H = 0: (B.35)
 Case 1. Suppose that (39) does not hold: qL  qH(1   H): If this is strict, or if it is an
equality and  > 0; (B.35) requires that H = 0: In the (measure-zero) case where it is an equality
and  = 0; the rm is indi¤erent and we shall break the indi¤erence by assuming that it still does
not use the ine¢ cient currency. Replacing H = 0 into (B.32) and the binding (B.33), we obtain
UL  qH [w(yH) +BH ] + qL [w(y) +BL]  qHyH )
UL   USIL  qH [w(yH) + (B   yH)   w(y)] : (B.36)
Let us rst show that yH = y: Otherwise, (B.34) implies that =(1+) = qL+qHw0(yH)= > 0
(by (21)), so UL = USIL ; meanwhile, L  0 requires =(1 + )  qL; so yH  y: But then y = y
and in (B.36) the right-hand side is strictly positive (as yH 2 (y; ycH)); contradicting UL = USIL :
Next, with yH = y; the right-hand side of (B.36) equals qH(B   y) if y  y and qH [w(y) +
(B   y)   w(y)] if y < y: Thus in both cases UL > USIL ; implying  = 0 and L > 0: From
(B.34) it follows that (B.32) and (B.36) are equalities, with yH = y; the latter shows that low
types receive a cross-subsidy which increases as y declines to y; then remains constant. This
allocation is the one described in Proposition 9-(1), and since UH   UL = y  y; it satises
the (omitted) high types incentive constraint. It is separating for y > y and pooling for y  y;
since (yH ; H) = (yL; L) = (y; 0) and UH   UL = y; implying zH = zL: As it solves the
relaxed problem it is interim e¢ cient and therefore (by standard arguments) the unique equilibrium.
Finally, UH = w(y) +BH and UL = w(y)  y +BL both increase as y declines to y:
49
 Case 2. When (39) holds, (B.31) must bind, otherwise  = 0 and (B.35) fails. From (B.32) and
the binding (B.33) we have UH = w(yH) +BH   (1  H)H  USIL + yH + H, so
(1  L)H  (B   yH) + w(yH)  w(y) > 0 (B.37)
since yH  y < ycH : With H > 0; (B.35) must be an equality, which yields =(1 + ) = qL  
qH(1   H)= > 0 and L=(1 + ) = qL   =(1 + ) > 0: Thus (B.32) is binding, (B.37) holds
with equality, and the left-hand side of (B.34) becomes (1 + )qH [w0(yH) + (1  H)=] > 0;
by (38); therefore yH = y: By (B.37), H = [(B   y) + w(y)   w(y)]=(1   L) is then strictly
increasing as y decreases from ycH to 0: Since UH   UL = y + H > yL; the high types
omitted incentive constraint is also satised. The solution to the relaxed program thus coincides
with the constrained-LCS allocation described in Proposition 9-(2), which is thus interim e¢ cient
and therefore, the unique equilibrium.
Finally, consider how welfare varies with y: Prots always equal zero and low types always
receive USIL ; which is increasing in y below y; then constant. As to high types, they achieve
UH = w(y) +BH  

1  H
1  L

[(B   y) + w(y)  w(y)]: (B.38)
The right-hand side is strictly concave in y on [y; ycH ] and decreasing below y
c
H ; by (38). Therefore,
UH is strictly increasing in y and maximized at ycH ; where the constraint ceases to bind. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Let us dene z and y as net compensations. In particular, y is still
the e¤ective power of the incentive scheme. Prot on type i = H;L under contract (y; z) is then
i = Aa(y) +B[i + b(y)]  z + y[i + b(y)]
1   ; (B.39)
while the expression for Ui is unchanged. Furthermore,
Ui + (1  )i = (1  ) [Aa(y) +B(i + b(y))]  [C(a(y); b(y))  va(y)]
 bw(y) + (1  )Bi: (B.40)
Let y()  y be the bilaterally e¢ cient power of incentives: y() = argmaxf bw(y)g: The LCS
equilibrium has yL = y() and yH given by bw(y())   bw(yH) =  [(1  )B   yH ] : Welfare W
is equal to qHw(yH) + qLw(yL) +B, and so
dW
d
j=0 = qLw0(yL)dy

d
+ qHw
0(yH)
dyH
d
= qHw
0(yH)
dyH
d
: (B.41)
Finally, for small  ;
bw0(yH) = w0(yH)   d
dyH
[Aa(yH) +Bb(yH)] = w
0(yH) + o())
dW
d
j=0 =   B
   w0(yH)qHw
0(yH) > 0:  (B.42)
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Lemma 8 The rst-best solution dened by (42) satises yA < A and yB < B:
Proof. The rst-order conditions (42) take the form
(A  yA)(@a=@yA) + (B   yB)  @b=@yA = ryA2A;
(A  yA)(@a=@yB) + (B   yB)  @b=@yB = ryB2B;
with all derivatives evaluated at (yA; yB): Let D  (@a=@yA)  @b=@yB   (@a=@yB)  @b=@yA ;
which is easily seen to equal 1=[CaaCbb   (Cab)2] > 0 (this holds for any (yA; yB)): We then have
A  yA = 1
D

(@b=@yB)
 
ryA2A=2
  (@b=@yA)  ryB2B=2 > 0;
B   yB = 1
D

(@a=@yA)
 
ryB2B=2
  (@a=@yB)  ryA2A=2 > 0: 
Proof of Lemma 2. The LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient i¤ it solves the relaxed program
max
f(Ui; yi)gi=H;L
fUHg; subject to
UL  UH   yAHA   yBHB;P
i=H;L
qi [w(yi) +Di   Ui]  0;
UL  USIL :
The solution to this program must satisfy yL = y. If the LCS allocation is not interim e¢ cient, the
solution must be such that UL > USIL , implying  = 0. Using the zero-prot condition, substituting
UL, using the incentive-compatibility condition and taking derivatives yields:
1
A
@w(yH)
@yAH
=
1
B
@w(yH)
@yBH
=   qL
qH
: (B.43)
Letting  denote the subsidyfrom the H- to the L-type, the above program can be rewritten as:
(Pr) : maxfUHg; subject to
UH  w(yH) +DH   qLqH 
USIL +   UH   yH 
  0
where yH  denotes the scalar product of yH 
 
yAH ; y
B
H

and    A;B. Note rst that
the rst two constraints must both be binding. Indeed, denoting i the Lagrange multiplier on the i-
th constraint, the rst-order conditions are 1 1 2 = 0 for UH ; 1rw(yH)+2 = 0 for yH and
3 1qL=qH+2 = 0 for : The rst two clearly exclude 1 = 0: If 2 = 0; then yH = y and 3 > 0;
implying  = 0; but then the second constraint becomes w(y)+DL = USIL  w(y)+DH y ;
hence 0  DH  DL   y  = (A  yA)A + (B   yB)B; a contradiction of Lemma 8.
Next, eliminating  from the binding constraints shows that yH solves maxfw(yH)+ `  yHg;
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where `  qL=qH 2 (0;1) is the likelihood ratio. Consider any two such ratios ` and ^` and the
corresponding optima yH and byH for this last program; if ^`> `, then
w(yH)  w(y^H) + `  (y^H   yH) ;
w(y^H)  w(yH) + ^`  (yH   y^H) :
Adding up these inequalities yields   (y^H   yH)  0, which in turn implies that w(yH) 
w(y^H): Observe now from (45) that the LCS allocation corresponds to an interior solution to
maxfw(yH) + c  yHg: Consider now any ` > c and the corresponding solution yH . We have
w(yH)  w (ycH) and so w(yH) + DH   `  w (ycH) + DH = U cH ;with strict inequality if  > 0:
This last case is impossible, however, since type Hs utility from the relaxed program cannot be
lower than U cH . Therefore,  = 0 and yH = y
c
H : the LCS allocation is interim e¢ cient.
Conversely, let ` < c; we then have (as a row-vector equality)
@
@yH
[w(yH) + `  yH ]yH=ycH = (l   
c);
with A  0 and B > 0: Since yH maximizes (each component of) the expression in brackets,
it must be that yAH  yAcH and yBH < yAcH ; hence   (ycH   yH) > 0: By the same properties shown
above, it follows that w(yH) > w(ycH): If  = 0; the two binding constraints in (Pr) then imply
UH = U
SI
L + yH  < USIL + ycH  = U cH ;
UH = w(yH) +DH > w(y
c
H) +DH = U
c
H ;
another contradiction. Therefore  must be positive after all, and interim e¢ ciency fails. 
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